

Haiti

Overview Updated January 4, 2010

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Introduction

After nearly two decades of instability, political leaders in Haiti and many members of the international community are hopeful that the country is moving toward consolidating its institutions and development over the course of the next few years. The current government, elected by a large majority of the population in 2006, is benefiting from what its international partners see as an undeniable legitimacy. As a result, it is enjoying strong support from funders within the international community. However, 2010 will be a pivotal year for the country. It has, depending on events, the potential to be one of either continuity or total change. Constitutional reform and elections are on the agenda. Several polls will take place, including a parliamentary election in February and a presidential vote at the end of the year. The stakes are high since the winner of the February general election will be in a position to either endorse or overturn the Constitution Amendment Bill tabled in Parliament by the Government in 2009 and, as a result, to determine the future shape of the country's institutions. The winner of the general election will also be in a good position for the upcoming presidential election. The current very fragile state of Haitian institutions is likely to complicate future progress.

In 2009, which was the second year of the implementation of the National Growth and Poverty-reduction strategy, the Haitian Government focused on tackling problems that had arisen in previous years. Special attention was given to the 2008 economic and international financial crisis and the resulting food and oil product price increases in Haiti as well as several hurricanes that severely damaged the country. These events led to social unrest and eventually to the resignation of Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis from the Prével Government. Following four months of dithering, Michèle Duvivier Pierre-Louis was appointed as the new Prime Minister. In 2009, the Pierre-Louis-Prével government sought to present a new image of Haiti to the World as a safe destination for foreign investors and capital. Prime Minister Pierre-Louis was criticized for his poor management of emergency funds. He was dismissed by Parliament and replaced by Plan Minister, Jean Max Bellerive in November 2009. The United Nations appointed well-known former US president Bill Clinton as its special envoy to promote investment. Criticism comes from all sides on the slow progress surrounding consolidating the democratic state law institutions and the increase in the population's standard of living. The daunting internal and external challenges including the lack of institutional capacity, drug trafficking and organized crime, environmental threats, and a global economic crisis will not be easily resolved even if country leaders feel an increasing urgency to provide adequate responses to the increasing demands of the population.

An international stabilization mission has been in operation in Haiti since August 2004. A series of Security Council resolutions have led to nine mandate renewals in six years. The UN's peace operations department defines these operations as being undertaken within a larger

effort to help countries transition from a conflict situation to one of sustainable peace. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the eighth UN mission to intervene in Haiti since 1991, is the centerpiece of international efforts to assist Haiti in state-building. The duration of the UN presence is supposed to be long enough to acquire ample evidence and lessons learned. MINUSTAH has strong regional engagement from North America (Canada and the United States) and Latin America. The most significant characteristic is the strong Latin American presence in the mission.

MINUSTAH is also seen as a multidimensional, complex operation. The classical peace operations mission creates a safe and secure environment, which is conducive to get the political process and dialogue up and running quickly. A multidimensional operation, however, must support reinforcing the State, on a long term basis, with its security situation, governance, rule of law – in addition to its social and economic situation (infrastructure, employment, etc). As such, it means taking on a greater role. The mission is now engaged in a series of activities and actions such as overseeing sea and boarder areas, containing drug trafficking, etc.

As well, all of the international players have come to a long term agreement. Nonetheless, political realities in contributing countries demand visible results and a clear exit strategy. This appears to be a critical time to consider the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Whether it is a cause or consequence of the State's lack of capacity, national appropriation and the Haitian government are being somewhat delayed in their fruition – even if an increasing involvement is being felt and even though we are hearing more positive rhetoric from Haitian authorities.

While the Peace Operations Monitor website is focused on the mandates, structures and performance of peace operations, it is also meant to reflect the complexity of integrated missions and take into account that these peace operations are just one element in a broader process that seeks to bring stability to the State. Therefore, this section on Haiti and MINUSTAH is not limited to an analysis of the mission's work; it also examines important challenges such as the country's economic development (see page on development) and a gendered perspective on human development and empowerment is provided (see page on gender issues).

Lastly, this website also provides an illustrated overview of Canada's contribution. Indeed, with decades of experience in Haiti and strong political commitment, Canada is well placed to play an important role in international efforts to re-establish security and stability in Haiti and to assist in longer-term reform and reconstruction efforts (see page on Canadian Contribution).

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The Impossible joint national project: 1804-2004

The creation of the Haitian state dates back to 1804, which makes it one of the oldest independent states in the Americas. As the first black republic and the location of the first formal slave uprising, Haiti was ostracized at the time of its independence by the greatest powers of the time (the United States only recognized its existence sixty years after independence). Colonial powers saw the successful emancipation of this rich sugar and coffee colony as a threat and even though its independence was won through armed conflict, it had to be bought – the former settlers were to be compensated to the tune of eight hundred million Euros.¹

Following the victory of Toussaint Louverture, the hero of independence, the successive leaders tried to rebuild the plantation economy. The economy, based on having large properties that would produce commercial goods, helped raise the funds to reimburse the price of independence.² Leaders of urban centres in the West and the South, mostly Mùllatos, were able to develop themselves through the long rule of President Jean-Pierre Boyer. They were able to put into place commercial and fiscal policies that were to their own benefit and taxed the common farmers.³ Together with freed Blacks (former military personnel who had been rewarded with plantations) they formed a new elite of landowners.⁴

The plantation economy, which required a disciplined labour force in order to succeed, reinforced the authoritarian ruling structures left behind by the French. This, along with the fears that the western powers would attempt to retake control of the country and the “class aspirations of Haitian leaders,” has had the effect of entrenching a despotic tradition of rule that all presidents, including Aristide, have perpetuated.⁵ It is thus not surprising that Haiti has been marked by recurring political crises: the American occupation and the public resistance to it between 1915 and 1934; the dissolution of forward-looking governments and the establishment of a new kind of government – dictatorship. The Duvaliers’ dictatorship, from 1957 to 1986, reinforced the structure of a state that was exclusively based on the army.

¹ Christophe Wargny, *Haiti n'existe pas, 1804-2004 deux cent ans de solitude*, Paris, p. 53

² Ibid .53.

³ M-R Trouillot in, *Haiti Dangerous crossroads*, p. 124.

⁴ Wargny, p. 61

⁵ Yasmine Shamsie, Andrew S. Thompson, *Haiti - Hope for a Fragile State*, Wilfrid Laurier Press, Waterloo, 2006, p. 3.

Contemporary economic and political perspectives

During the last thirty years, the country underwent two periods of economic growth that benefited only a small part of society and therefore failed to have any significant impact on the disparity and poverty faced by the majority of the population. In fact, during the first period from 1970 to 1981, inequalities grew and the standard of living of the rural population decreased. In addition, several authors have highlighted the failure of structural adjustment and stabilization programs modeled along the lines of the so-called "Washington Consensus".⁶

Upon the fall of the Duvaliers in 1986, Haitians were crying out for democracy. Unions, student movements and other civil society organizations started pushing for democratization and social justice. However, the years from 1986 to 2004 proved to be a downward slope; the term "a never ending transition" became a fixture in discourse and practices. At the same time, political polarization became ingrained, with the passions of generally illiterate crowds further exacerbated by charismatic leaders wanting to reproduce the tentacles of the dictatorship.

The development of an intensified crisis situation in 2004

In 1990, during general euphoria surrounding the dawn of democracy, the priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide came to power himself by winning an election landslide. He had been put forward by a coalition of social democratic parties and had been very active politically with his anti-American speeches as well as his actions taken against the government. People in urban slums and rural areas that had always been excluded finally came to power through Aristide who represented them. This impulsive intervention occurred on the backdrop of speeches and hateful acts against the country's ruling and political class.

In September 1991, Aristide was ousted in a military coup. The economic and political elites had become concerned about their fate under a president so close to the grassroots and called on the Haitian army, whose underlying goal in the past had been to look after the interests of those who had always been in positions of power. A military junta led by General Raoul Cedras took over the leadership of the country.⁷

Following the military coup, an economic and commercial embargo was placed upon the country and the international community called for the return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Finally, in 1994, Aristide returned to power a few months before the end of his time in office thanks to the efforts of the international community under the auspices of US forces, which, within a very short period of time, neutralized the Haitian army.

The return of President Aristide and the constitutional order corresponded with the second period of economic growth. Privatization and liberalization combined with a reliance on international cooperation and an increase in domestic revenue and remittances generated an average growth rate of 2%. The positive effects of this increase were quickly counterbalanced by the negative effects of demographic pressure in an urban setting devoid of adequate infrastructure, leading to rising insecurity in urban areas.

⁶ Y. et Cadet, C. among others.

⁷ Haiti Dangerous Crossroads, NACLA, 1995; Christophe Warny, *Haiti n'existe pas*, 2004.

In 1995, René Prével, Aristide's former Prime Minister and heir apparent, was elected President. Five years later, in 2000, President Prével and his Prime Minister Jacques Édouard Alexis held so-called general elections in a general disorder that easily helped Aristide back to power. These elections, characterized by the abstention of the opposition parties, were so highly contested by parties as well as political leaders that they were the starting point for the next level of the crisis leading to the fall of Aristide in 2004.

From 2000 to 2004, political tensions worsened. Aristide fuelled the conflict through his speeches and his actions. Aristide's overzealous *chimères*⁸, or militia, knocked everybody around – students, universities, unions, university presidents, and political parties. Splinter groups and armed insurgencies took root all over the country. Port-au-Prince was constantly up in flames. Dead bodies littered the roads, the sewers, and the landfills. Haiti descended into complete chaos and those who were able to do so left the country behind and fled to the Dominican Republic. At the end of 2003, during Aristide's fall in 2004, the sociopolitical crisis reached its peak and became not only explosive, but an untenable situation. Meanwhile, institutionally, the situation was worsening especially given the fact that Aristide was entwined with the *chimères*, who had to do everything in their forces to keep him in power as a condition of their own survival.

The international community, beginning with Haiti's "friends" - Canada, Venezuela, France, the United States, the OAS, CARICOM buckled down to try to resolve the issue.

CARICOM tries to find a solution

Upon seeing Haiti's multi-dimensional crisis that ravaged the country in 2003-2004, CARICOM (which includes 14 countries from the surrounding region) mobilized its efforts and resources to help Haiti overcome this deadlock. They tried to negotiate some sort of institutional way out of the crisis.

Behind the scenes diplomatic work brought about intense negotiations that resulted in a Plan of Action signed by President Aristide and four CARICOM heads of government with the support of the US, Canada, the OAS, and the EU. The plan indicated that the President would stay in power until the end of his term (in February 2006) and that a new, neutral and independent Prime Minister would be appointed.

The political opposition, civil society and the business community declined to participate in any negotiations that did not address the issue of President Aristide's departure. Their concerns grew when Haiti's former armed forces began reconstituting themselves as the "Cannibal Army", occupying all provincial cities and heading for the capital.

On 26 February 2004, the Permanent Council of the OAS adopted Resolution CP/RES. 862 (1401/04) which, in light of extreme violence and the growing threat of insurgents, requested the UN Security Council to take "necessary and appropriate urgent measures" to address Haiti's crisis. On 29 February, prior to the Cannibal Army's arrival in Port-au-Prince, American diplomats persuaded Mr. Aristide to go into exile. The *chimères* (militias) that he left behind dug into the few businesses and industries that had survived. A social crisis went hand-in-hand with the political and institutional crises.

⁸ The name given to recruited, unemployed youth who were armed and used by Aristide against his opponents.

CARICOM member countries were concerned about reaching some kind of consensus on a way out of the crisis. Moreover, CARICOM, confronted by the international power grab, refused to recognize the new transition government (2004-2006) and requested that investigations be held into the reasons and conditions behind this intervention that was seen as ambiguous and confusing by many stakeholders and observers. Initial official motivations for the use of military force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was suggested by political scientist Cary Hector, who argued that "the situation in Haiti constitutes a threat to international peace and security and to stability in the Caribbean, especially through the potential outflow of people to other states in the subregion".⁹

Haiti as a threat to security

Towards the end of the 20th century armed conflicts occurred in a number of Central American states. In many of these countries, present-day rates of violence remain very high. Scores of armed groups or gangs are at work, especially in urban areas. Haiti is no exception; however, it is only in Haiti where these armed gangs are seen as having the potential to destabilize the state.¹⁰ Urban violence has grown rapidly during the last two decades. It inhibits the country's development. At the same time, the root causes of this violence are complex and context-specific. It is therefore impossible to point one's finger at a single factor.

Many studies have revealed the various beliefs and motivations of the armed groups that were operating and still operate in the national capital region:

(...) aggressive gangs (...) control most of Port-au-Prince's slums and (...) benefit from a varying degree of political and criminal support. Many are manipulated by parties who were close to former President Aristide and his Lavalas movement, others controlled by anti-Aristide movements, from elites within the business world, drug traffickers or other criminal organizations. Without the presence of an army, another armed group made up of former rebels and former Haitian Armed Forces members had an alarming presence in the provinces. These groups have thousands of arms in their possession.¹¹

Below, we will shed light on some of the various origins of the acts of present-day violence in Haiti that have contributed to this regional threat as well as becoming a barrier to the country's development.

Political Origins

Political violence runs throughout Haiti's past. It reached an unprecedented level under the regime of the elder Duvalier, who used it to silence all political opposition. During Aristide's

⁹ Hector, Cary, "La intervención multinacional de 2004 en Haití : Antecedentes, resultados y perspectivas," Pensamiento Propio, January-June 2007 and Matthew J. Smith, "CARICOM and the Politics of Crisis Management in Haiti, 2004-2006," *ibid.*

¹⁰ Mulet, Edmond, Center for strategic and International Studies, Roundtable discussion with ambassador Edmond Mulet, January 2007.

¹¹ Spoiling security, ICG Report, May 2005.

first term, youth groups, who were loyal to Aristide, were given arms and received military training in order to counter the effects of any attempts at destabilization.¹² The provision of arms went on into his second term (2000 to 2004). Members of the Haitian National Police (*Police Nationale d'Haïti*, PNH) would have participated in violent acts that occurred during the contested elections in 2000 that were not recognized by the OAS.¹³

Drug trade origins

The Island of Hispanola and its poorly-guarded coastline provide an ideal place to smuggle illegal drugs. The increased drug production and trade in the South and consumption in the North has created a world-wide problem so large that in 1994, Haiti had the unfortunate reputation of being the second-largest hub of cocaine trafficking in America. It was suspected that the entourage of President Aristide during his second term of office were involved in drug trafficking in Haiti.¹⁴ It is estimated that approximately 10 tonnes of cocaine were trafficked through Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 2005.¹⁵ In 2006, US authorities identified 159 flights heading to Haiti and the Dominican Republic that were transporting drugs from South America.

Other individuals from various political circles also had the reputation of being involved in trafficking controlled substances.¹⁶ From March to May 2007, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) undertook two operations to reduce this kind of trafficking. 40% fewer flights carried drugs during this period compared to the four preceding months. There was, however, a total of 1,135 kilograms of cocaine found in aircraft that had landed in Haiti. The end result was a considerable decrease in drug trafficking by air coming from Colombia and Venezuela at the expense of those going to the Dominican Republic.

Recruits from the Haitian National Police were trained by the JIATF-S (Joint Inter Agency Task Force, South: DEA, FBI, CBP) in the war against drugs and the refoulement[IF1] of illegal

¹² Robert Muggah Securing Haiti's Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, Small Arms Survey 2005. From January 2005 onward, President Aristide's supporters held almost daily demonstrations in the streets of some neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince; Brazilian MINUSTAH posted to the Bel Air neighbourhood of Fort National witnessed how demonstrators moved in a very organized and strategic manner, just as military troops do and very similar to the training they had received.

¹³ Janice Stromsem, Joseph Trincellito, *Building the Haitian National Police: A Retrospective and Prospective View*.

¹⁴ Oriel Jean (Chief of Security under Aristide), Jean Nesly Lucien, (Aristide's own Former Chief of Security, former Chief of Police), Evantz Brilliant, (former Head of the Bureau on the War against Drug Trafficking or *Bureau de lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiant*, BLTS), Rudy Therassan (former Head of the Bureau of Research and Investigation or *Bureau de recherche et d'investigation*, BRI), Romane Jean-Lustin (former Head of Airport Security), et Jean-Marie Fourel Célestin (Aristide's family member, Founding Member of LaFanmi Lavalas and former Senate President) are all currently imprisoned in the United States for drug trafficking. Cited by Raoul Peck and Yannic Lahens, *Le Matin*, 3 June 2005.

¹⁵ South American Cocaine Trafficking Operations Shift Toward Venezuela, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, May 2006.

¹⁶ http://www.dominionpaper.ca/weblogs/nik_barry_shaw/1256, visité le 15/03/08.

immigrants (more than 1000 people were caught attempting to cross the seas north of Haiti in 2007).¹⁷

Socio-economic origins

Globalization and overarching neo-liberal policies contributed to the increase in social polarization since the beginning of the 1980s. Research and data from Latin America and the Caribbean have called into question the cause and effect relationship between poverty and violence. Instead, statistics show that inequality and exclusion (unequal access to education, employment, health and infrastructure) add to poverty and encourage violence. Moreover, in these contexts of extreme inequality, poor living conditions of the urban poor increase the potential for conflict and criminal activity.¹⁸

One of the consequences of trade liberalization under the younger Duvalier's regime and the failing Haitian state at this time was the significant erosion of its traditional role of controlling the flow of goods and tax collection in Haiti, leading to a sharp increase in smuggling of goods by organized criminal groups.¹⁹

Gender-specific demonstrations

A recent study done by the Inter-American Development Bank shows that the general perception of female victims of violence, counsellors and community members is that rates of violence in Haiti are very high and that there is a link between social violence and inter-family and sexual violence.²⁰

In fact, the fragile political and socio-economic situation in the country created conditions that favour an increase in violence and crime (rape and kidnapping). Data collected by organizations such as Gheskio, Kay Fanm and Sofa show that, over the years, reported cases of sexual violence have skyrocketed. Underage girls more and more frequently become victims of gang rape. Organizations working in the field can only provide limited responses because of difficulties in documenting alleged cases, the institutional, technical, and financial shortcomings, the lack of coordination between involved organizations, the lack of ratification of bills negotiated between women's organizations and the 46th legislature as well as for other reasons.²¹

The accumulation of these brutal threats increasingly affects Haitians, particularly women, and risks affecting the sub-region. It has once again pushed the international community to intervene in February 2004 with the announced intention to, this time, take the time required to find a lasting solution.

¹⁷ <http://www.archivex-ht.com/blog/2008/03/04/haiti-2008-international-narcotics-control-strategy-report/>.

¹⁸ Moser, Caroline O. N., *Reducing Urban Violence in Developing Countries*, The Brookings Institution, November 2006.

¹⁹ Charles Cadet, *ibid*, p. 27.

²⁰ IDB Study, *Une réponse à la violence faite aux femmes en Haïti*, March 2007, p. 17.

²¹ <http://www.unfpa.org/emergencies/symposium06/docs/daytwosessionfiveachancyhaiti.ppt>

The UN system in Haiti

FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization

In Haiti, FAO is aiming to increase the availability of food and the population's access to food stuffs, and to improve its quality. FAO intervenes most notably in the dissemination of agricultural techniques which can be reproduced at the level of small holdings and which are capable of guaranteeing a rapid and lasting increase in agricultural production. Its initiatives can also be seen in the development and exploitation, complete yet sustainable, of fragile ecosystems by a better management of their natural resources, particularly in mountainous regions and areas threatened by desertification.

UNCDF – United Nations Capital Development Fund

The UNCDF encourages the participation of people and community groups in the process of local planning and formulates its activities with a wide array of partners, including local authorities. In Haiti the UNCDF works in close liaison with the UNDP in order to help the government execute a series of innovative programmes, especially in the field of good governance and decentralisation.

IFDA – International Fund for Agricultural Development

IFDA is a specialised unit of the United Nations created as a financial institution in 1977, following the World Food Conference in 1974. IFDA supports governments' efforts dedicated to the eradication of poverty. In Haiti since 1978, IFDA has financed six projects at a total cost of \$69.9 million US. Two are currently in operation: the Project for the Intensification of Food-producing Cultivation (currently in phase 2, *Projet d'intensification des cultures vivrières, PICV 2*) and the Support Programme for Rural Production Initiatives (*Programme d'appui aux initiatives productives en milieu rural, PAIP*). These projects contribute to the improvement of living conditions and the increase in revenue for rural populations.

OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

In Haiti OCHA supports the humanitarian coordinator by bringing together numerous entities of the United Nations and the humanitarian community for the response required to the humanitarian needs of the country. OCHA shares information and ideas with the other UN agencies, MINUSTAH, partners in the international community and amongst the Haitian civilian organisations, through written situational reports and regular humanitarian forums.

IOM – International Organization on Migration

The mandate of the International Organization on Migration (IOM) consists of promoting orderly and humane migration which benefits the migrants and the society – of the

government of the country of origin, the transit state, as well as that of the destination state. In Haiti the IOM works by offering youth living in marginalised urban communities alternatives to violence in order to deal with some of the underlying causes of the instability which can potentially lead to external migrations which are always more destabilising. At the same time, the IOM is developing longer-term initiatives which aim to aid the Haitian government in adapting its system of migration management to the contemporary national and regional realities in line with the legal international norms.

UNAIDS – The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

UNAIDS is a common innovative initiative that brings together seven organisations of the United Nations system (BM, PAHO-WHO, UNDP, PNUFID, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF) with the aim of ensuring a coordinated and intensive response to HIV/AIDS. In Haiti the contribution of UN/AIDS has been of great importance as HIV/AIDS is seen as “public enemy number one”. UN/AIDS has established excellent cooperation with the Haitian government but also with other sectors dealing with the AIDS problem. Amongst its important contributions in Haiti, UN/AIDS supported the development of the national strategic plan for the fight against HIV/AIDS launched in 2002.

PAHO/WHO – Pan American Health Organisation and the World Health Organisation

PAHO/WHO is the agency in the UN system that specializes in health. The principal mandate of the PAHO/WHO in Haiti is to give its aid to the Haitian government to ensure and improve sanitary conditions for the Haitian population with emphasis on decentralization using the community health units (Unités Communales de Santé, UCS), the reduction of deaths as a result of childbirth and infant mortality, an integrated approach to childhood diseases, the prevention of mother to child HIV/AIDS transmission and the access to essential medication. In the context of its activities, it has also added the objective to reduce the vulnerability of the population to natural disasters.

WFP – United Nations World Food Programme

The WFP is the first food aid agency in Haiti. It supplies aid to 850,000 people, 10% of the total population, targeting children under five years of age suffering malnutrition, pregnant women, anaemic nursing mothers, and people living with HIV/AIDS or undergoing treatment for tuberculosis. The WFP is also an education point throughout school canteens reaching 300,000 children. Because of its long-standing presence in Haiti and its expertise in the field of emergency relief, the WFP also plays an important role in the follow-up on food security, contingency planning and emergency preparations.

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

The UNDP undertakes the promotion of human development and the reduction of poverty. In Haiti, the UNDP accompanies the national players in their various domains, including the promotion of good governance, the reduction of poverty and social exclusion, the reinforcement of the judicial system, the sustainable environmental management, risk and natural disaster prevention, the fight against HIV/AIDS, the protection and respect of human rights. The UNDP puts particular emphasis on the programmes aiming to reduce poverty, as well as on good governance, in line to attain the objectives set in the Millennium Declaration.

UN-Habitat – United Nations Human Settlements Programme

The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) is the United Nations' agency mandated with helping member states in the pursuit of the "Cities without Slums" objective. It is dedicated to promoting lasting urban development and the improvement of living conditions for the inhabitants of cities and shanty-towns in particular. In Haiti, UN-Habitat supports the municipalities to develop urban policies and local urban development plans and provides public institutions with technical assistance and supports the putting into effect of programmes and projects in the field of area development, decentralisation, urban planning, housing and provisional of essential urban services.

UNESCO – United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organisation

The principal mandate of UNESCO is to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the world by strengthening through education, science and culture, collaboration amongst nations in order to ensure universal respect for human rights and the fundamental freedoms that belong to all. Through its principal functions, UNESCO is a laboratory of ideas, a prescriptive organisation, a centre for exchanges and information, an organisation for the development of capabilities within member states and a catalyst for international cooperation.

UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund

UNICEF's mandate consists of defending the rights of children and helping to meet their essential needs. In Haiti, UNICEF supports the implementation of health and nutrition programmes, education and child protection programmes, particularly for those living in extremely vulnerable situations. UNICEF provides the country with all the vaccines, provisions and equipment necessary and intervenes to help reduce mortality during childbirth and the prevention of HIV transmission from mother to child. It also offers support to children infected and affected by HIV/AIDS, street children and those in trouble with the law.

UNIFEM – United Nations Development Fund for Women

UNIFEM just established an office in Haiti in 2008. This agency's work consists in promoting the participation of women at all levels of planning and practice for development. It acts as a catalyst within the United Nations by supporting the efforts which allow a link to be made between the question and needs of women and the critical questions at a national level.

UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund

The aim of UNFPA is to raise awareness of the need to place women at the heart of the debate for lasting development. In Haiti, UNFPA is committed alongside national partners to participating in the development process and to a reduction in poverty as a result in the improvement in reproductive health, the promotion of gender equality and the prevention of acts of sexual violence. UNFPA's contribution is found also in the context of the follow-up to recommendations from the action programme of the International Conference for Population and Development through sub-programmes on reproductive health, population development and defending gender and human rights.

UNOPS – United Nations Office for Project Services

UNOPS offers a project management and purchasing service to the departments and organisations of the UN, for international financial institutions and governments. UNOPS is recognised throughout the UN system as an execution partner in several fields (elections, job

creation, local governance) and the leader regarding physical infrastructures. Since 2005, UNOPS/Haiti has worked with diverse partners (UNDP, MINUSTAH, USAID, UNICEF), in various projects covering: restoration (schools, electoral offices, and more recently, small hydro-electrical stations); logistical support for the Conseil Électorale Provisoire (CEP) and political parties; training and supervision of electoral officers; and the management of transmission centers. UNOPS/Haiti has 213 national employees, 11 international employees and has offices in each of the 10 provinces.

UNV – United Nations Volunteer Programme

The UNV constitutes the volunteer arm of the UN which is managed by the UNDP. The UNV promotes national and international volunteers in the service of development throughout the world. In Haiti they are more than twenty, national and international, to collaborate with UNPD or other agencies. In parallel, MINUSTAH counts 150 UNV volunteers spread throughout the territory. They participate in fields as varied as food security, agriculture, risk and natural disaster management, rule of law and democratic governance, environmental management, health management and child protection.

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Background to UN missions in Haiti

Over the course of a period of 10 years, the country saw two foreign interventions on both military and humanitarian fronts, without ever having a war between political factions themselves. The first was in 1994, with Jean-Bertrand Aristide coming back to power after being kicked out of power during the September 1991 coup d'état. The second was in February 2004 following his removal from power, an intervention that was, this time, supported by a large, local, sociopolitical coalition and members of the International Community, such as the United States, France, Canada, Brazil, and Chile.

No less than eight United Nations missions were deployed in Haiti, the last of which was under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations because the country was seen as "a menace to the region's international peace and security." (Resolution 1840, October 2008). Among the factors that contribute to the instability are: the departure of Aristide and the 2004-2006 intermediary government, the brutal coups (from 1986 to 1991), the violation of human rights, and the migrants (boat people) that sneak past international controls. This is all happening within the national context of increased poverty, which is accentuated by a disastrous economy and environmental catastrophes in addition to weak state and government institutions and elite leaders driven by power struggles and predatory interests. This has led to focusing interventions on three principal objectives:

- 1) The restoration of rule of law;
- 2) The reinforcement of democracy; and
- 3) The reinforcement of security forces and borders.

List of the seven UN and joint missions from 1993 to 2002

NAME	DURATION	MANDATE
MICIVIH	03 to 10/1993 and from	Protection and promotion of human rights in response to the 1991 military coup.
UN-OEA	01 to 06/1994	
	and	
	10/1994 to 03/2000	

UNMIIH		Monitor the return of President Aristide and the resignation of General Cédras; modernisation of the armed forces and support for the creation of a national police; establishment of a favourable environment for holding free and legitimate elections; support the democratic government in its maintenance of a secure and stable environment.
UNSMIH	07/1996 to 07/1997	Support the development and professionalization of the PNH; maintain a secure and stable environment; support the activities promoting the reinforcement of institutions, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation.
UNTMIIH	08 to 11/1997	Support the development and professionalization of the PNH, including the special forces; provide security for UN personnel; support the activities that promote the reinforcement of institutions, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitations.
MIPONUH MICAH	12/1997 to 03/2000 03/2000 to 02/2001	Continue the UN's support for the PNH. Consolidate the progress already made in terms of the advancement of human rights; reinforce the institutional capacity of the PNH and judiciary power with technical support; promote dialogue between the international community and key Haitian players.

Interim Multinational Interim Force (MIF)

On 29 February 2004, when the conflict in Haiti threatened to reach the capital directly, President Jean Bertrand Aristide was taken from the country on board a US aircraft to an unknown destination. His resignation letter was read by Yvon Neptune, the prime minister which he himself had appointed. In accordance with the constitution, the president of the court of appeal, Boniface Alexandre, was immediately named interim president. A request for assistance to support the political process underway was then submitted to the Security Council, which in turn passed resolution 1529 to authorize the creation and deployment of the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) in Haiti for a period of three months under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The MIF was under American command.

The mission's mandate was to:

- a) Facilitate the implementation of conditions of security and stability in the Haitian capital, and elsewhere in the country, in accordance with requirements and circumstances;
- b) Facilitate the provision and delivery of humanitarian aid;

c) Facilitate the provision of international aid to the Haitian police and coast guard in order to re-establish and maintain security and public order and to promote and protect human rights;

d) Favour the creation of conditions that will allow international and regional organizations, notably the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) to bring aid to the Haitian people; and

e) Coordinate the actions of the force, as necessary, with that of the special OAS mission and the UN special envoy for Haiti, in order to avoid a renewed deterioration of the humanitarian situation.²²

On 9 March a consultative committee composed of eminent Haitians (the Conseil des Sages), named a new prime minister, Gérard Latortue, former Minister of Foreign Affairs under the government of Leslie François Manigat in 1988. The Interim President Boniface Alexandre and the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Conseil des Sages (composed initially of seven members representing diverse political and social affiliations) then undertook to form a transitional government composed of 13 members.

On 4 April 2004, the representatives of the political class, the private sector and unions reached a consensus on the political transition five weeks after the departure of Jean Bertrand Aristide. This agreement aimed to favour transition and the holding of elections in the country. The new administration, which had committed itself to guaranteeing the security of the population and promoting a climate of stability, also needed to address the issue of the members of the former Haitian army.²³

Fanmi Lavalas, the political party of the outgoing president, denounced the pact. The pact delineated the measures to be taken in a series of domains: security, development, the fight against corruption and the lack of accountability, decentralization, elections, judicial reforms, initiatives towards a national conference and a new social contract, institutional strengthening of political parties and civil society organizations, rehabilitation of former armed components and the professionalization of the national Haitian police. The pact also allowed the signatories to engage in discussions with the United Nations concerning the status of the MIF and the peacekeeping operation that would ensue.

In March 2004, a UN multidisciplinary evaluation team was sent to Haiti to identify the nature and scale of the needs the imminent peacekeeping operation would need to meet.

Composition of the MIF

The Multinational Interim Force for Haiti, deployed immediately following the departure of President Aristide, was commanded by General Coleman (US Marine Corps) who took command on 15 March. The MIF was deployed according to geographic sectors imparting to France (550 soldiers) the Northern sector of the country (Cap Haitien), and the Southern sector under American responsibility (1700 soldiers). The MIF was also composed of Canadians (110 soldiers) and Chileans (330 soldiers).

²² United Nations, S/RES/1529 (2004)

²³ democratie.francophonie.org/IMG/doc/Haiti_Consensus_de_transition_politique.doc

MINUSTAH

In a report to the Security Council dated 16 April 2004, the Secretary General drew lessons from past United Nations experiences in Haiti that had achieved only limited success. These failures were in part attributed to the different Haitian players but also to the international community involved in Haiti. Too often international actors neglected the need to build meaningful, effective and lasting partnerships with Haitians and their representatives when elaborating their development policies.²⁴

The Secretary General, therefore, recommended the creation of a multidimensional stabilization operation in Haiti, and on 30 April 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1542 establishing the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for an initial duration of six months with the intention of prolonging the mandate. The transfer of power from MIF took place on 1 June 2004.

The initial mandate

The three main points of MINUSTAH's mandate were to:

- enable a secure and stable environment;
- support the current political process; and
- guarantee the respect of human rights.

MINUSTAH, the eighth United Nations mission, is a complex and multidimensional peacekeeping operation which operates under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, without peace accords or cease-fires existing between the parties in conflict.²⁵ The subsequent resolutions: 1576 (29 November 2004); 1601 (31 May 2005), 1608 (22 June 2005), 1658 (14 February 2006) 1702 (17 August 2006), 1743 (15 February 2007), 1780 (15 October 2007), 1840 (2008) all reinforced MINUSTAH's same mandate while underlining the priorities of the current economic climate.

Resolution 1576, underlines the importance of the creation of the Core Group on Haiti; resolution 1601 underlines the importance of holding elections, requests the interim government immediately puts a stop to the lack of accountability and lawlessness and facilitates the launch of the program for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). Resolution 1658 exhorts MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police (HNP) to collaborate with the international community for a reform of the entire policing system. Resolution 1702 notes that the conditions necessary for the implementation of classic disarmament and demobilization program are not present in Haiti, and that different programs are needed to respond to local circumstances. The Security Council instructed MINUSTAH, in close coordination with the Haitian government and the other concerned parties, notably the donors, to reorient its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts in order to better achieve the objective.

²⁴ <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/304/28/IMG/N0430428.pdf?OpenElement>

²⁵ Colonel Jacques Morneau, Reflection on the situation in Haiti, in Shamsie and Thompson, Hope for a fragile state, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006.

Resolution 1743 urges the international community to put together a new system to coordinate aid, based on immediate needs, as well as long-term development and the reduction of poverty, and to ensure its proper functioning in cooperation with the Haitian authorities. Resolution 1780 instructs MINUSTAH to put its specialist technical knowledge at the disposal of the Haitian government to help it follow a comprehensive approach to the management of its borders, the emphasis being put on the reinforcement of the state's capabilities and underlining the necessity to offer the Haitian government coordinated international support in this domain.²⁶

UN resolution 1780 takes into consideration the appeals of the President of the Republic for development tasks while at the same time not meeting them, strengthening of the national police, and a better control of the territory. The latter point included the deployment of forces to Haiti's land and maritime borders with the reinforcement of the four main crossing points: Malpasse, Anse à Pitre, Belladère and Ouanaminthe; as well as the deployment of rapid frigates all along the 1500 km of coastal borders with the possibility of having one for every 100 km. Supplied by 30 frigates, the maritime borders would be better controlled and the action range for each frigate would be reduced to 50 km.

Budget and Composition of MINUSTAH (2004 to the present)

MINUSTAH had an initial operating budget of \$200 million following an initial meeting of Haiti funding providers, which was held in Washington in May 2004. From the period of 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, it had a budget of \$489,207,100. From the period of 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009, MINUSTAH's funding rose to USD \$575 million. The mission budget for the period 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010 stands at \$ 611,751,200.

Resolution 1542 authorized an initial deployment of a maximum of 6,700 soldiers, 1,622 UNPOL (United Nations police officers), 548 international employees, 154 United Nations Volunteers, and 995 local employees. Brazil was put in charge of the military forces.

The different contingents of MINUSTAH arrived gradually and Brazil installing itself in Port-au-Prince while Multinational Interim Force troops were reassigned to MINUSTAH as a peacekeeping force. France, Canada, and the United States continued initially to hold operational responsibility over the country's troops.

Total MINUSTAH troop levels have dropped from 7,041 in 2008 to 6,940 in 2009-2010, while the number of UNPOL staff, which stood at 2,036 in 2008-2009 will rise to 2,211 between 2009 and 2011.

27[b] The total of 11,000 positions represents the potential human resources that are not presently being filled.

The figures marked with an asterisk are budgeted estimates while the figures without an asterisk represent actual staff as of 31 October 2008.

As of October 2008, military personnel was made up of police (60%) and UNPOL and FPU together represented slightly over 20%.

²⁶ See Resolutions [S/RES/1780 \(2006\)](#); [S/RES/1743 \(2006\)](#); [S/RES/1702 \(2006\)](#); [S/RES/1658 \(2005\)](#); [S/RES/1608 \(2005\)](#); [S/RES/1601 \(2005\)](#); [S/RES/1576 \(2004\)](#).

With a relative increase in safety, the dominant military composition of the mission received more and more criticism. Even though many Security Council resolutions (Resolution 1702 and those that followed it) suggested reduced military personnel, an increase in police officers and transforming the mission into one of development support, Resolution 1840 renewed MINSUTAH's mandate until 15 October 2009, without changing the numbers of personnel although there was a significant reinforcement of the PNH. The most recent resolution (13 October 2009) renewed MINUSTAH's mandate and only slightly amended the troop to police officer ratio.

Civilian personnel was eventually divided into three categories: International civilians and the UNVs that represented barely 6% of the Mission's staff and national Haitians employed by the Mission that represented slightly more than 11%.

In large part, women were greatly under-represented in the Mission, particularly within military and police personnel. In fact, on 1 October 2008, they may have represented 33% of the international civil personnel, 26% of the UNV personnel, and 13.1% of the national civil personnel, but they only made up 1.74% of the military force, 6.77% of UNPOL, and 3.31% of the FPU.²⁸ [c]

29[c] Statistics provided by MINUSTAH' Gender Unit, Port-au-Prince, November 2008.

Heads of MINUSTAH

Hédi Annabi, was appointed Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) in August 2007. Since 1997, he held the post of Under Secretary General of Peacekeeping Operations. The various preceding civilian MINUSTAH heads were: Juan Gabriel Valdés, a Chilean (from August 2004 to May 2006) and Edmond Mulet, a Guatemalan (from June 2006 to August 2007).

The Commanders of the military were all Brazilians, with the exception for a brief period when a Chilean was in an acting position:

Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, Brazil, 2004 to August 2005

Urano Teixeira da Matta Bacellar, Brazil, September 2005 to January 2006

Eduardo Aldunate Herman, Chile, January 2006 (acting)

Jos_ Elito Carvalho Siqueira, Brazil, January 2006 to January 2007

Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz, Brazil, January 2007 to Present

Current staffing

Countries contributing personnel to the military and police force:

Argentina	Congo (DR)	Guinea	Romania
Australia	Colombia	Italy	Russia
Benin	Ivory Coast	Jordan	Rwanda
Bolivia	Croatia	Madagascar	Senegal
Brazil	Egypt	Mali	Serbia
Burkina-Faso	El Salvador	Nepal	Sri Lanka
Cameroon	Equator	Niger	Togo
Canada	Spain	Nigeria	Turkey
Central Africa	United States	Pakistan	Uruguay
Chad	France	Paraguay	Yemen
Chili	Grenada	Peru	
Chine	Guatemala	Philippines	

Roles and allocations of the different sections

The SRSG runs both MINUSTAH's civilian and military components and is directly linked to three sections: political affairs, legal affairs and public information and communication.

Political affairs

The section initiates on a regular basis contacts with political parties, members of the government and representatives of civilian organizations, universities, the private sector and the diplomatic corps. Its mandate is to contribute towards the three-fold process of the Haitian transition towards national reconciliation, democracy and a modern nation-state.

Communication and public information office

The Communication and Public Information Office (CPIO) is responsible for explaining MINUSTAH's mandate while reinforcing the visibility of the mission in Haiti and abroad. The section is represented in four areas of the country. It produces audio-visual programs and has a website. Since 2006 it has been trying, without success, to obtain an FM channel.

Legal affairs

This section is responsible for all the legal aspects of the links which the mission establishes in the country: service contracts, rental or purchase of goods or buildings, the implementation of quick impact projects (QIPS), etc. It advises the SRSG to this effect.

Conduct unit

The conduct and disciplinary unit is answerable to the office of the Special Representative to the Secretary General. It is situated at MINUSTAH's headquarter in Port-au-Prince. The unit

can receive complaints regarding MINSUTAH's personnel including complaints relating to deaths or material damages.

The three pillars of MINUSTAH's activities

a) Military

The military force is commanded by Major-General Floriano Peizoto Viera. It is responsible for security and stabilization in Haiti.

To accomplish its mission, the military force has four specific support entities:

1. Two companies of engineers (1 Brazilian, 1 Ecuadorian-Chilean);
2. Two military aviation units (1 Argentinian, 1 Chilean);
3. Field hospital (Argentinian); and
4. Military police unit.

The military component of MINUSTAH also supports the provision of emergency relief to the civilian population in the event of natural or man-made disasters. It organized rescue operations helping thousands of victims of the floods in Gonaïves in September 2004, in 2006 during the torrential rains, again in 2007, and in 2008 during the cyclones that caused such damage throughout the country.

b) Civilian affairs

The SRSG is assisted by two deputies each responsible for a pillar comprising various sections of MINUSTAH. The Principle Deputy, Luiz Carlos Da Costa, is in charge of several sections: administration, security, human rights, justice, civilian affairs and UNPOL.

MINUSTAH has offices in each of the country's 10 administrative regions and it is the civilian affairs section that is responsible for the civilian representation of the mission and the coordination of the activities of the other components. The mandates and the activities of the different sections are described as follows:

Civilian affairs

The section supports the development of a body of civil servants and the establishment of local authorities capable of organizing public services throughout the country. It intends to contribute to the proper functioning of the senate and the chamber of representatives and to reinforce the decentralized public institutions. It aims to increase the responsibility and participation of citizens in public affairs and government, to promote a national dialogue and to aid the resolution of local conflicts.

Since June 2004, MINUSTAH has implemented more than 130 quick impact projects, for a total of \$1.3 million US, which support the rehabilitation of infrastructure (schools, hospitals, and municipalities), civic education, the construction of water pumps and cisterns, and the rehabilitation of roads.

Human rights

In cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), this section has as its mandate to monitor the human rights situation, notably refugees and displaced persons who have returned home. It must also support Haitian government institutions and human rights groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights. Present in MINUSTAH's 10 regional bases, the human rights section's activities include:

- observing and documenting of the human rights situation throughout the country;
- assisting the government to define a strategy to improve accountability;
- developing a national educational program on human rights (training for the Haitian national police force); and integrating a human rights dimension in the operational activities of MINUSTAH and the other United Nations agencies.

Justice Section

Its mandate is to help re-establish and maintain the rule of law and public security by providing technical assistance with a view to examining all the pertinent legislation, defining and rapidly putting into effect the measures needed to deal with prison overpopulation and prolonged provisional detention and provide the coordination and planning for these activities (excerpt from Resolution 1702). The section carries out several accompanying programs with the Ministry of Justice, the judicial inspectorate, and the School of Magistrates. It also carries out support programs for legislative reform and access to justice.

MINUSTAH's Corrections Unit

The Corrections Unit, through its work on the penal infrastructure and the welfare of detainees, helps to set up a safe and secure prison environment starting with the physical infrastructure itself. The majority of the work undertaken by the Corrections Unit is carried out in collaboration with the Haitian penitentiary administration directorate (Direction de l'Administration Pénitentiaire, DAP), the national authority responsible for the penitentiary service in Haiti.

UNPOL

As part of MINUSTAH's mandate, UNPOL is called on to contribute to the "restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order through the provision inter alia of operational support to the Haitian National Police (HNP) and the Haitian Coast Guard". Furthermore, it contributes towards creating a safe and stable environment, helps the transition government to supervise, restructure and reform the HNP in accordance with the norms expected of a democratic police, notably by carrying out background checks of its members and registering its personnel; by giving advice on questions of reorganization and training, including raising awareness of women's issues, and providing supervision and training of the police force.

c) Development pillar

Mr. Joël Boutroue was appointed in 2007 to the post of Deputy Special Representative for MINUSTAH with the responsibilities of Humanitarian Coordinator, Resident Coordinator and Residential Representative for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

UNDP

The UNDP in Haiti aims to contribute to implementing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that were set by the Millennium Summit participants in September 2000. The United Nations gave UNDP the authority over assessing and supporting implementing the MDGs.

Humanitarian affairs

This section has as a mandate to:

- Maintain MINUSTAH's response capacity in the face of disasters by providing the support necessary in terms of communication, logistics and security for the humanitarian community and the government;
- Support the preparation and response for disasters through active participation in the Provincial Disaster and Risk Management Committee (Comité départemental de gestion des risques et désastres, CDGRD) and coordinate MINUSTAH's response with government structures, UN systems and other actors in the humanitarian community; and
- Collaborate with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the government's counterparts at departmental level for the collation and validation of humanitarian information.

Gender section

The essential element of the mandate of this section is to be found in [Resolution 1325 \(2000\) on Women, Peace and Security](#). The Security Council expresses "its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component."

The two principle aims of the Equality Office in Haiti are: a) to combat violence against women in all its forms; and b) to encourage the participation of women in the next elections, as candidates and voters.

The Equality Office in cooperation with UNPOL and the HNP works to reinforce the reception procedures in the women's commissions for victims of violence (including the layout and fitting-out of facilities and the training of the Haitian police men and women for a better management of the registered cases, especially when it comes to sexual violence against women).

DDR: Community Violence Reduction (CVR)

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration section (DDR) changed its name in 2007 to reflect the change in direction of its activities and is now called Community Violence Reduction (CVR). It supports the government's National Commission on Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (NCDDR). It aims to harmonize the vision and the intervention capacity of the different partners involved in CVR in order to facilitate regulation in matters of control and weapons circulation in Haiti, to support the potential beneficiaries with a view to their reintegration in their communities, and to inform and mobilize the different stakeholders in society on the actions that will encourage the reduction of violence and the control of firearms.

Child Protection Unit

MINUSTAH's mandate includes specific reference to the promotion of human rights, particularly those of women and children – see Security Council resolutions [1542 \(April 2004\)](#) and [1608 \(June 2005\)](#).

The last resolution regarding Haiti in particular, [Security Council Resolution 1702 \(August 2006\)](#), instructs MINUSTAH to deal with the issue of violence against women and children. With reference to [Resolution 1612 \(July 2005\)](#), the unit has developed a follow-up mechanism and reports on armed violence committed against children. The unit works in close collaboration with the national institutions working on the rights and protection of children. All the unit's activities are undertaken in full coordination with UNICEF.

HIV/AIDS Unit

The unit's mandate is to:

- Develop awareness and information sessions on HIV/AIDS for all the component parts of the mission, the national Haitian police force, former Haitian army members and the former members of armed gangs.

- Maintain partnership relations within the United Nations framework with the national authorities, the international community, NGOs, associations for persons living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHIV/AIDS), and the private sector.

- Inform about HIV/AIDS by distributing educational material on HIV/AIDS such as e-mails, information leaflets, condoms, post exposure prophylactic kits (PEP kits) and providing HIV testing facilities for all MINUSTAH personnel. To date the unit has carried out around 2,000 screening tests on mission personnel.

Disappointing results of global UN interventions in Haïti

Despite some seemingly successful moments, the UN's interventions (sometimes in conjunction with the OAS) as a whole has to be seen as a failure;³⁰ a failure attributable as much to the predatory tendencies of the Haitian governments which succeeded each other during this period, as to insufficient follow-through on policies promoted by the international community.³¹ Furthermore, the principle criticism levelled from all sides is that these missions

³⁰ Barthélémy responds to Valdes, in *Le Monde* and *Le Matin*, 2005; James B. Foley, American ambassador in Haiti to 2004, quoted by Cary Hector in "La intervención multinacional de 2004 en Haïti" *Pensamiento Propio*, enero-junio 2007, p. 16.

³¹ Pierre-Louis, Michèle, taken from a doctoral speech *Honoris Causa*, Saint Michael College, Vermont, USA, 13 May 2004.

left too soon without finishing what they started, that is, the real consolidation of the existing institutions (the national police and the judiciary).³²

The different missions expressed the necessity of rebuilding the state by strengthening the institutions which constitute it.³³ However the costs involved in creating such a process are simply too high for a country which, in the end, does not hold a strategic interest.³⁴

A significant number of MINUSTAH's initial goals of fostering a more stable and secure environment have been achieved. A reform initiative designed to strengthen the National Haitian Police Force - the national entity responsible for ensuring law and order - has been in place since August 2006. Gangs perpetrating the new crime of kidnapping have been dismantled and no longer have the potential to destabilize the Government.

Acceptance and debate over the nature of the mandates

At no point was the presence of foreign military troops unanimously accepted in Haiti. From MIF to MINUSTAH, numerous voices were raised demanding the departure of the troops,³⁵ denouncing it as foreign occupation, which for some had interrupted the eventual confrontation necessary between a hated regime and its numerous opponents. During the transition government (2004-2006), on several occasions, accusations of the violation of the rights of Haitians were levelled against the military component of MINUSTAH.³⁶

Following Préval's election, in 2006, the Security Council requested a re-evaluation of the mandate in order to determine whether it should be pursued as is, or not. For months different sectors in Haiti had been demanding changes to the mandate such that the military contingent, seen as of little use or even too tolerant to the destabilizing elements, be replaced by engineers and heavy machinery brought to Haiti to contribute to the reconstruction of the country's infrastructure.

Although Security Council resolution 1892 adopted on 13 October provided some alteration to staffing configurations, the level of mandate remains unchanged. However, the Security Council recognized the fact that the challenges facing Haiti are interlinked and that economic development is required in order to guarantee stability and security. However, even if undesirable, this military presence is seen by many Haitians as indispensable in the current circumstances and acts as a deterrent to all categories of bandits and armed gangs. Furthermore, MINUSTAH has helped the government and the national police substantially in their struggle against violence, drugs and the maintenance of order in the country at an acceptable level.

Sex scandals and internal corruption in MINUSTAH

Like many other UN missions, MINUSTAH has had its share of sex scandals. In 2005, following mounting criticism, the UN adopted a policy of zero tolerance, such that soldiers accused of

³² Edmond Mulet, Roundtable Discussion, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2007.

³³ Robert Fatton jr, 'Haiti: The Saturnalia of Emancipation and the Vicissitudes of Predatory Rule', Third World Quarterly, vol. 27, no 1, 2006.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Concertation National pour un Plaidoyer, Plate-forme pour un Développement Alternatif, two Haitian NGO group.

³⁶ Raul Zibechi, 'Repression in Haiti: The Responsibility of the Left', America's Programs, 28 March 2007.

misconduct are repatriated, tried and punished in their country of origin. At the end of November 2007, 108 Sri Lankan soldiers accused of sexual exploitation were repatriated.³⁷ The minister for women and women's rights insisted that the accused be tried immediately on their return to their country. Since the arrival of MINUSTAH in Haiti, women's rights organisations (SOFA, Kay Fanm)³⁸ have received several complaints of rapes committed by soldiers, police and civilian personnel.

The UN equally investigated fraud allegation and mismanagement in acquisitions in the context of its operations. Accusations were made against five employees for having influenced an oil delivery contract to the value of \$10 million US per year to a Haitian company, Distributeurs Nationaux SA.³⁹

The Latin American presence in MINUSTAH

Seen by some as a regional effort in solidarity, the significant presence of troops, police and civilian personnel of Latin American origin demonstrates those countries' interest in the mission. 80% of the military and police force comes from the South American continent [Mullet, 2007].⁴⁰

Despite sending additional police in 2008, **close to 95% of the Latin American resources were military**. Only 11% of the police force and 11% of the international civilian force came from the Latin American countries. The heads of these countries repeatedly complained that they should be better represented in the two above-mentioned areas of the Mission.⁴¹ [d]

42[d] David Morin, OIF Report, to be published in 2009

Brazil's presence in the mission is highly visible as the leader of the military component. The Brazilian supporters of this presence argued that Brazil had to assume its regional leadership responsibilities to be recognized as such in international forums (mainly within the UN), and it represented an opportunity to put into action its multilateral policies. Indeed, this participation, supported by the Brazilian congress, could have had positive internal consequences as well as the external ones. It would increase the dialogue already in existence with countries of the sub-region (albeit in different contexts, Mercosur, for example) such as Argentina and Chile, in cooperation with the other members of the Core Group (Canada amongst others) in the context of joint projects. However both the Left and the Right denounced this involvement as an exercise in regional neo-imperialism, or even the subordination of Brazilian interest to that of the United States.⁴³

The presence of Latin American countries in MINUSTAH has been questioned and the arguments brandished for national autonomy and freedom of action, responsibility towards the UN, do not hold for certain critics. Chile was the first country in the region, from March 2004, to send troops to the multinational force. Argentina and Brazil followed in June. These

³⁷ Concertation National pour un Plaidoyer, Plate-forme pour un Développement Alternatif, two Haitian NGO group.

³⁸ See SOFA report, 2007, "Violence faite aux femmes en Haïti." (Violence against women in Haiti.)

³⁹ Haiti Press Network, 21 December 2007.

⁴⁰ Mulet, Edmond, *ibid.*

⁴³ Rocha de Oliveira, Flavio & Rodrigues, Gilberto M.A., Rodrigues, Thiago, "A crise do Haïti: historia perspectives e a MINUSTAH", CRIES, 2007, p. 3.

decisions were taken in a hasty manner, without real coherence and with the absence of regional coordination and planning. From this critical point of view, the presence of these countries is counter-current to the policy of regional peace and security. Individual national interests took precedence over the collective interests of the region and the Latin American decision regarding Haiti cannot be interpreted as an altruistic act whose primary aim is the democratic stability or the defence of the rights of the Haitian people.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, 'Salir de Haiti', in Haiti Info, 6 January 2005.

Relief Activities Updated March 30, 2009

SECTION CONTENTS:

OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

In Haiti OCHA supports the humanitarian coordinator by bringing together numerous entities of the United Nations and the humanitarian community for the response required to the humanitarian needs of the country. OCHA shares information and ideas with the other UN agencies, MINUSTAH, partners in the international community and amongst the Haitian civilian organisations, through written situational reports and regular humanitarian forums.

WFP – United Nations World Food Programme

The WFP is the first food aid agency in Haiti. It supplies aid to 850,000 people, 10% of the total population, targeting children under five years of age suffering malnutrition, pregnant women, anaemic nursing mothers, and people living with HIV/AIDS or undergoing treatment for tuberculosis. The WFP is also an education point throughout school canteens reaching 300,000 children. Because of its long-standing presence in Haiti and its expertise in the field of emergency relief, the WFP also plays an important role in the follow-up on food security, contingency planning and emergency preparations.

Statistics

Haiti may have made significant strides since President René Prével was elected in 2006, but the changes he has pushed have been [incremental](#), not fast enough for many down-and-out Haitians. In 2005, national food production only covered 41% of the country's dietary needs and more than half or 53% were filled through food that was imported while the remainder came from international assistance. The resulting food security issues were worsened by the majority of the population's limited access to food. Haitians spend 55% of their earnings on foodstuffs. A contrast to this is that food aid has dropped by 35% over the course of the past few years. Given this, a crisis (called "food riots") has arisen that is linked to the increase in the cost of foodstuffs and has also deepened pressure on families that had to choose between food supplies and access to other social services, particularly health and child education.

This political turmoil brought down Prime Minister Jacques Édouard Alexis' government in April 2008 and the report of the funders' meeting that would have meant a united commitment and funding by the international community.

The Prime Minister's seat was vacant for a period of four months and parliament rejected two candidates for the position. Eventually, in August, right in the middle of the cyclones that devastated the country, Michèle Pierre Louis was appointed Prime Minister of Haiti. The Prime Minister only held office for a year, during which time she endeavoured to promote a more positive image of Haiti to the World in an attempt to attract foreign investment. Despite this initiative, her Government was severely criticized for its management of emergency funds in the wake of a series of devastating hurricanes that struck the country in 2008. In October 2009, she was relieved of her duties by Parliament and replaced by Jean Max Bellerive, who had been Plan Minister since 2006.

In fact, the population's increasingly fragile state is harming Haiti's path to political stabilization. If the basic needs of Haiti's citizens are not met, the progress the country has made in the last three years will be at great risk. Haitians are well-acquainted with scarcity:

Life expectancy at birth is estimated at 58.1% (2000-2005).

Maternal mortality has risen from 457 to 630 per 100,000 live births between 1990 and 2005.

Illiteracy remains high at 39% in 2003 in spite of observed progress between generations.

Only 49% of school age children attend school. These low levels of education translate into limited capacities. In 2001-2002, only 45% of the population aged 6 to 24 attended an educational institution or university.

Barely 25% of households have access to drinking water and very few have access to adequate sanitary installations.

Haiti has a high [rate of extreme poverty](#): 56% of the population live on less than \$1 a day, a total of 77% of the population live on less than \$2 a day.

The [income distribution](#) is very unequal: the GINI index has reached 0.65, by far greater than Brazil's index (0.59), which is generally considered as the most inegalitarian country in Latin America.

The [geography of poverty](#) shows a significant difference between conditions in rural and urban areas. About 90% of the poor live outside the capital, with a strong concentration in rural areas (77%). The Départements of the North-East and North-West have the highest rates of extreme poverty.

UNICEF estimates that more than 170,000 children, mostly girls, do not attend school and engage in forced labor in a practice known as [restavek](#). Many come to the capital from rural areas, where parents say they have no resources to provide food and schooling for some of their children.

The [causes of poverty](#) are diverse and complex. In addition to frequent political instability (which tends to affect mainly the urban population), a lack of an enabling environment (including infrastructure) for businesses and farmers as well as insufficient provision of basic services are considered to be important factors. In addition, environmental hazards (droughts, floods) and degradation (erosion) are relevant. In terms of economic factors, the low productivity of the agricultural sector, the lack of opportunities for employment and the generation of income, the rising cost of living as well as the loss of capital among rural households appear to be most important.

The fact remains however, that the German NGO Transparency International ranked Haiti the 168th most corrupt country out of a list of 180 in its 2009 annual report on perceived corruption. Haiti has maintained a positive economic growth rate of approximately 2.0%, which is however, below the 3.7% recorded during the previous fiscal year.

Donor support

On 23 May 2006, the Brasilia Conference on Haiti was the opportunity for the newly elected government to present its vision. The international community responded in concrete terms to this vision at the Conference on Haiti on 25 July 2006 in Port-au-Prince. To the government's request of \$545 million, the international community responded with promises of \$750 million over the following fourteen months. "This would serve to improve essential services in poor rural and urban areas".⁴⁵ The 25 July 2006 conference was followed by another held in Madrid, Spain on 30 November 2006, that was generally based on the Paris Declaration in order to introduce the concept of "co-responsibility" or "shared responsibility" between the government and the international community.

About 1 _ years later, the Ministry of Planning and Foreign Commerce regretted being unable to give an account of funds announced and extended by the international community because 75% of these funds went through Haitian or international NGOs. No accounting is therefore available. Of course, disbursement can be accounted for but their concrete results are not explicit. This is also due to the fact that there was no start-up profile to use as a benchmark for the end profile.⁴⁶

A Framework for Long-Term Development

Overall, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) were developed in the late 1990s by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as instruments for poverty reduction and promoting growth by placing the final responsibility on governments. They are considered as a precondition for a country like Haiti to benefit from the international community's external debt release initiative. However, contrary to the former Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the 80s and 90s, they deal with specific realities and constraints of each country (Ref., NSGPR draft, October 2007).

The PRSP development process began under the presidency of Aristide. After work was interrupted in 2004 and it was replaced by the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), the Interim PRSP (IPRSP) was reactivated by the transition government, modified as National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (NSGPR) as a "window of opportunity" in September 2006 (with a G for growth) through a participatory and inclusive process that was expanded and deepened in 2007, then validated in September 2007 and finalized in November 2007. It was published on 3 December 2007 on the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation Web site. (<http://www.mpce.gouv.ht>).

⁴⁵ Joint press release of the High Level Meeting on Haiti, Brasilia, Brazil, 23 May 2006.

⁴⁶ Intervention by Jean Max Bellerive, Minister of Planning, at ISC offices, an Haitian NGO, Port-au-Prince, March 2008.

The Three Pillars of a Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction

Pillar 1 focuses on growth areas: agriculture and rural development, tourism, infrastructure modernisation, science, technology and innovation.

Pillar 2 focuses on human development and significantly improving access to opportunities, including social services, that people might more effectively develop their capacities in terms of education and training, health care, water and water purification, highlighting activities for handicapped people (800,000 persons), poor children (2.7 million), youth (over 50% of the population), HIV/AIDS (103,669 people living with HIV/AIDS in 2005) and gender equity.

Pillar 3 is focused on democratic governance, modernization of the State, establishing the rule of law, particularly in terms of Justice and Security, and land-use planning.

Preserving macroeconomic and fiscal stability is considered basic elements for implementing the NSGPR.

Strategy Financing, Implementation and Monitoring

To be operational in 2007-2010, the NSGPR requires the sum of 154 billion gourdes (154,560,000,000 HTG) or \$3.86 billion.

There are two levels in the implementation and monitoring of the NSGPR: one level, strategic, is under the sponsorship of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister's arbitration; the other is operational and is facilitated by the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation as well as by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. These levels integrate the principal development partners: the private sector, the territorial communities, and the cooperation sector, including international agencies and NGOs.

Overall, this implementation structure is controlled by the President of the Republic who, for this purpose, sponsors the National Commission on Investments that is responsible for researching the competitiveness of Haitian resources and the performance of public investments, including those related to large projects. Within this Commission, the Prime Minister's Office runs a Priorities Arbitration Board whose principal role is to provide guidance for public investments. Similarly, through their respective technical structures, the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation and the Ministry of Economy and Finance will coordinate the operationalization, execution and monitoring of agreed-upon activities in collaboration with sectoral ministries through Studies and Programs Units.

International Support

The following sub-sections describe and analyze the international community's commitments within the NSGPR presented by pillar and sectoral funds. They will continue to be updated as the international community's commitments are confirmed. Nonetheless, we can note that the national plan's total amount is \$4 billion, including \$2.5 billion funded by the public purse.

The following table illustrates loan and donation commitments of the eight largest funding countries as reflected in Haiti's national budget 2009-2010 :

1	European Union	\$ 315 628 577	27%
2	USA	\$ 298 154 560	25%
3	Inter-American Development Bank	\$ 216 004 500	19%
4	Canada	\$ 104 787 122	9%
5	World Bank	\$ 56 912 510	5%
6	France	\$ 42 278 193	3.65%
7	Spain	\$ 37 785 155	3.3%
8	Venezuela	\$ 29 658 537	2.6%

Pillar 1: Growth Areas

The NSGPR is part of Haiti's global vision of development and includes two fundamental options: a) sustainable human development based on the three-fold growth of economics, social justice and environment and b) a totally renewed public management system. Pillar 1 includes 4 vectors of growth: agriculture and rural development, tourism, infrastructure modernization, science, technology and innovation.

The projects, programs and funds listed below are given as examples of what is already being done because the new funds will only become official at the conference of government and funders that will occur at the end of April 2008.

Pillar Two: Human Development

In Pillar 2 on human development, basic social services are given priority. It deals with education, promoting a modern health care system accessible to vulnerable groups, and encouraging the largest possible public/private partnership for drinking water and purification.

Pillar Three: Democratic Governance

Pillar 3 is dedicated to democratic governance with justice and security as priorities. Therefore, the first objective is to establish the rule of law, especially relating to justice and security. Setting up an equitable legal order, a functioning judicial system, and a general atmosphere of security are essential conditions for growth and for poverty reduction.

Civil Society Role Updated March 30, 2009

SECTION CONTENTS:

Gender/Peace Issues Updated March 30, 2009

SECTION CONTENTS: [STATISTICS](#) | [STRUGGLE FOR GENDER EQUALITY](#)

Statistics

Demographics: According to the last census in 2003, 51.8% of the Haitian population is made up of women. In urban areas, there are 86 men for every 100 women and, in rural areas there are 98 men for every 100 women. More than half of the 8,730,750 inhabitants are less than 21 years old and only 5% are more than 64 years old. The fertility rate is 4.1 children per female. Life expectancy at birth is 52.7 years for men and 56.8 for women.

Health. Haiti is one of the countries in the world with the highest child, youth and infant mortality rates. Infant mortality dropped from 74 to 57 in the last 20 years and youth mortality rates from 61 to 31. Maternal mortality rates increased from 523 deaths for every 100,000 births from 1994-2000 to 630 deaths for every 100,000 births from 1998 to 2000. In _ of these cases, women had home births. The rate of women living with HIV/AIDS in the 15-49 age range is estimated to be 2.3%, which is slightly higher than that of men of the same age range (2.0%). The prevalence according to gender is 115 infected women for every 100 men.

Education. The literacy rate is much higher for men than for women: 63.8% for men as opposed to 58.3% for women. For the population over 5 years of age, 37.4% have never gone to school, 35.2% completed primary school, and 21.5% finished secondary school. There is no substantive difference between basic completion of schooling between girls and boys at the primary level. However, completion of the secondary school level drops to 37% for girls as compared to a 45% completion rate for boys. Only 1.1% (1.4% of men compared to 0.7% of women) attend university.

Economy:⁴⁷ For the population over the age of 15 years old, 54% make up the country's workforce. For the population ten (10) years and older, the rate is 47.7%. Broken down by gender, the rate of those in the workforce for the population 15 years and older is 65.5% for men and 46.4% for women. More women (59.3%) than men (42.1%) make up the non-working population. Regardless of where they live, females are still the majority in "wholesale and retail" markets, including 69.2% in urban areas and 88.0% in rural areas. Regardless of the occupation and environment, women are less represented than men, except in the

⁴⁷ See [4th Population and Environmental Census, 2003](#).

“independent” and “family assistance” categories in urban areas. Throughout the country, 44% of all households are female-headed. Added to the weight of women’s single parenting is the phenomenon of matrifocality.

Politics: From 1986 to 1990, one or two females per government were heads of departments or secretaries of State such as Social Affairs, National Education, and Health. In 2007, four women were senators, four were MPs and two were ministers.

Legal issues: Although Haiti ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the current Constitution calls for equality between men and women, what has been set out does not always become written law. As a result, women’s objective situation is that they are ignored, particularly where common law unions are concerned. The Civil Code only recognizes marriage while in actual fact the large majority of people living together are consensual (55% versus 44.5% for legal marriage). More women are involved in these kinds of relationships (56.8% of females compared to 54.1% of men).

Women’s organizations have made progress in the sense that rape was put under the title of “indecent assault” and is now classified under “sexual assault”. In fact, new sentencing provisions and strengthened penalties must be implemented to discourage rapists.

During 2007, the Minister of the Status of Women and Women’s Rights⁴⁸ proposed three draft bills: a bill on the parent-child relationship and the admissibility of paternity hearings; a bill on the status of concubines (*plaçage*), a bill on the regulation of domestic work. Bills on the partial decriminalization of abortion and criminal law legislation on violence against women are all being developed.

Struggle for Gender Equality

There is no longer any question about Haitian women’s participation in the struggle for national liberation. History does not give due justice to women⁴⁹ such as: Marie Claire Heureuse Dessalines, Sanite Belair, Catherine Flon, Henriette St-Marc, Dédé Babile, Marie Jeanne, Toya, Cecile Fatima, Suzanne Louverture, Marie Louise and many others who defended the principles of freedom, sometimes risking their own lives for national independence. The political and social involvement of women in Haiti arrived, therefore, quite a bit before international women’s movements that started at the beginning of the 19th century.

The year 1934 was an important turning point in the struggle for women’s equality. It saw the creation of the Women’s Social Action League⁵⁰ (*Ligue Féminine d’Action Sociale*) whose main objectives were ensuring civil and political equality for all Haitians (men and women) with regard to political, voting, and eligibility rights. The existence of the League led to the 1950 decision of the Haitian State to recognize women’s voting rights and their right to be political

⁴⁸ MCFDF: The Department of the Status of Women and Women’s Rights ((*Ministère à la Condition Féminine et aux Droits des Femmes* in French)

⁴⁹ Mirlande Manigat, [Etre femme en Haïti hier et aujourd’hui- le regard des Constitutions, des lois et de la société](#), Presse, Université Quisqueya, 2002; See also Jasmine Claude-Narcisse, [Mémoire de femmes](#), Unicef-Haïti, 1997.

⁵⁰ Madeleine Sylvain-Bouchereau (1957). *Haiti et ses femmes- Une étude d’évolution culturelle*. Port-au-Prince : imprimerie Les presses libres.

candidates; these rights were exercised for the first time only in 1957. Following this first legal battle, the feminist movement went undercover with the rise of the Duvalier family's tyrannical leadership in 1964.⁵¹

Another turning point in the evolution of the status of women movement in Haiti occurred in 1986. Women's mobilization was a defining element of the Haitian socio-political landscape. A historical demonstration organized by women was held on 3 April 1986 during which they reaffirmed their refusal of being excluded and showed that they were not willing to accept a democracy being built without them or built at their expense.

The military coup in September 1991 marked the beginning of a period of repression for women. Nevertheless, women's networks stayed alive, going underground from the beginning. Women paid a very heavy price during this period during which cruelty extended to using rape as a weapon of terror and repression.

In 2003-2004, women's organizations that were part of the National Women's Rights Advocacy Coordinating Committee (*Coordination nationale de plaidoyer pour les droits des femmes or CONAP*), joined with unions, political organizations, students and other sectors of civil society to collectively declare the Lavalas government to be acting above the law.

Lavalas' bridages created a climate in which women's organizations that denounced the abuses of the powers that be were threatened both verbally and physically. On 8 March 2003, International Women's Day, police and the militia (*chimères*) suppressed women's organizations; the more militant actors were arrested and kidnapped. Women's organizations were subject to similar kinds of repression by Lavalas' henchmen right up until Aristide's fall from power in February 2004.

The chronic political instability in Haiti has not give the women's movement, which was very promising at the fall of the Duvalier government, much of an opportunity to prove itself. The creation of the Department of the Status of Women and Women's Rights (MCFDF) and, in particular, its survival has helped women's organizations mobilize themselves. According to article 22, from the Order-in-Council of 22 December 2005, the MCFDF is the national mechanism responsible for "creating and applying, setting and ensuring compliance with the government's policy by working to create an egalitarian society for both sexes; to orient the definition and execution of fair national public policy."

The MCFDF used the transition period (2004-2006) to reinforce its institutional, organizational, and operational structures; to develop civil society consultation mechanisms, particularly to connect with women's organizations and create partnerships with international organizations and NGOs; to finalize bills that should soon be presented to the new parliament. The MCFDF should also think about creating a structure that would allow it to quickly and coherently address the issue of violence against women. Under its leadership, a "gender" working group has been formed under the Interim Cooperation Framework (*Cadre de cooperation internationale* or CCI in French) sectorial group.

In fact, the fragile political and socio-economic situation in the country created conditions favourable to increased violence and crime (rape and kidnapping). Data collected by organizations such as Gheskio, Kay Fanm and Sofa show that reported cases of sexual violence have seen a rapid increase over the past few years. Underage girls are more and

⁵¹ Evandro Bonfim. Les femmes haïtiennes, gardiennes de la tradition libertaire du pays. 21 mars 2004 : RISAL - Réseau d'information et de solidarité avec l'Amérique latine. URL: <http://risal.collectifs.net/>

more often becoming victims and gang rape is increasingly prevalent. Organizations working in the field can only provide limited responses because, among other things, the challenges involved in documenting and recording actual cases, the technical, financial institutional inadequacies, the lack of coordination between the involved bodies, the non-existent bills negotiated between women's organizations and the 46th Parliament, the fact that few sectors outside women's organizations take up this challenge.⁵²

In order to respond in a structured and efficient way to the phenomenon of violence against women, and sexual violence in particular, the MCFDF led, with the support of International Cooperation Agencies, representatives of the State, civil society, and international agencies a framework to harmonize national efforts. This strategy was supported by the United Nations, Canadian cooperation, and South-South cooperation (Brazil). The objectives of the National Plan to Address Violence against Women were to put in place a data collection system, to prevent violence specifically targeted at women, to increase coordination of care and support services, and to reinforce the capacity of involved public institutions to fully take on their coordination role with civil society. The National Forum against Violence against Women (*Concertation Nationale contre les violences faites aux femmes*) developed a basic toolkit to prevent violence against women, to victims and their families and to provide overall care for victims (medical protocol, a sample medical certificate, content to train caregivers, communications tools, etc).

Four strategies were included:

Promote and reinforce partnerships between involved departments, civil society organizations and the different international cooperation agencies;

Establish mechanisms for national action with levels of national, departmental, and regional coordination;

Reinforce information and knowledge in the area of violence against women and emphasize the value of including violence against women as a full Human Rights violation; and

Promote and combine a multi-sectoral approach that includes other international or regional partners with a view to better coordinating intervention and maximizing results.

The stability of women's organizations within the National Women's Rights Advocacy Coordinating Committee (*Coordination nationale de plaidoyer pour les droits des femmes or CONAP*), the existence of the MCFDF (which is responsible for implementing policies on equal rights and promoting women's rights), the presence of a National Plan against Violence against Women are all structures that should assist in implementing national policies on the promotion of women's rights.

The fact that these priorities were codified in the 2007 National Strategy Document on Growth and Poverty Reduction (*Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté*, DSNCRP in French) is very significant. It appears to indicate that the present government and the international community are aware of the intricate links between stabilization, gender equality, and sustainable development. The women's movement could also be a driving force to ensure the implementation of the entire DSNCRP, which is required in order to move from temporary stabilization to inclusive and sustainable development.

⁵² <http://www.unfpa.org/emergencies/symposium06/docs/daytwosessionfiveachancyhaiti.ppt>

Brief background

The Canadian leadership sees itself reinforcing its position, notably in Haiti where it has had an aid program since the 1960s. Haiti is the main beneficiary of Canadian development aid and personnel deployed in the Americas, and by far the most significant worldwide after Afghanistan. Canada is committed for the long term.

(Extract from 2008 strategy document not yet published.)

Canada has maintained diplomatic links with Haiti without interruption since 1959.⁵³ It has been involved in Haiti for over 30 years via CIDA and has participated in all the United Nations and OAS missions by providing military, police and civilian personnel. Towards the end of the Duplessis premiership in Quebec (1960), the winds of secularization sweeping through Quebecois institutions generated an intensification of missionary activities of numerous religious congregations towards Africa and Haiti. Numerous Canadian NGOs followed suit and pursued support for development in Haiti.

The Canadian Haitian diaspora is significant (around 120,000 people), spread over several cities (Montreal, Quebec, Ottawa, Trois-Rivières, Sherbrooke, etc.). This diaspora was in the first wave made up of political refugees (the Haitian intellectual and professional elite) escaping the Duvalier dictatorship of the 1960s and 70s; thereafter the subsequent influxes became more diversified. Many of the members of the diaspora participated, and continue to do so, in the community and political life of Canada (as members of parliament, senators, etc.). The Governor General of Canada, Michaëlle Jean, made her first official visit to her native country in 2006.

The three following periods defined Canada's engagement over the course of the last 15 years:⁵⁴

1994 to 1995 was the period of return to constitutional order and the end of Jean Bertrand Aristide's mandate; Canada concentrated on emergency aid, food aid, reconstruction and quick impact projects.

1996 to 1999 was the period of the first election to the presidency of René Garcia Préval; Canada wanted to reinforce the capacity of public institutions to deliver essential services to the population.

⁵³ Robert Muggah, The Peril of Changing Donor Priorities in Fragile States: The Case of Haiti, 2007, p. 177.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 180-182.

2000 to 2003 was the period of the contested 2000 elections, not recognized by the OAS. Extremely high levels of corruption forced Canada to bypass the state and provide its aid via a combination of national and international NGOs in order to put pressure on the state for a more transparent management of aid. Canada was not the only country to tie its aid to conditions.

Since then, the international community has learnt some lessons from these experiences.

Current Approach

CIDA expenditures in 2006-2007 on projects and initiatives in Haiti: \$92.5 million: CIDA Statistics for 2006-2007

Canada is the second largest bilateral donor with \$555 million CAD committed over a period of five years (2006-2011).⁵⁵ in its efforts to help in Haiti's reconstruction and development. It is the country's second largest bilateral donor. Haiti is the largest recipient of long term Canadian development assistance in the Americas and the second in the world.

Canada's priorities in Haiti include: reinforcing good governance, helping to build a transparent and responsible government, fighting against corruption, and reestablishing the rule of law.

Canada's assistance is mostly provided through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). It works with the priorities of the Haitian government to focus on the following three pillars: reinforcing the State, providing access to basic services (health, education, and infrastructure), and quickly improving the socio-economic environment.

Increased standard of living

Canada works on many fronts to contribute to poverty reduction in Haiti. In particular, it looks to increase access to health services and education and to develop basic infrastructure (i.e., roads and electricity). It also contributes to job creation programs and has championed Haitian debt alleviation.

Safer environment

Canada contributes to improving security throughout the country by deploying police offices, military troops, and correctional services expert to the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). In addition is the important role that Canada plays in helping to reform the police and jail systems, the reduction in community violence, and boarder reinforcement.

Souder democratic structures

Canada is supporting the implementation of a responsible and effective political system. Among other things, Canada is helping strengthen Haiti's executive and legislative branches, public service and civil society so that each can play its rightful role in a modern nation. Canada is also working to strengthen electoral structures to ensure the success of future political transitions in the country.

⁵⁵ Numbers released at the donors meeting of July 2006.

Strengthened rule of law

Canada is working with the Government of Haiti to strengthen and modernize Haiti's justice system so it can better protect the rights of all its citizens. Efforts are directed at improving access to justice and extending its reach to all areas of government activity.

Better living conditions

Canada is working on several fronts to help reduce poverty in Haiti. Efforts are particularly aimed at improving access to health and education services, and at developing basic infrastructure, such as roads, and electricity. Canada is also contributing to job creation programs and is an advocate for international relief for Haiti's debt.

A more secure environment

Canada is helping to improve security throughout the country by deploying police officers, military personnel and corrections experts to MINUSTAH. In addition, Canada is playing a crucial role in reforming the police force and prison system, reducing violence in communities and enhancing border management.

Fragile states strategy

For Canada, Haiti is part of the group of fragile states, that is to say, countries whose governments are not disposed to assuming the fundamental functions of the state, or who do not have the capacity to do so i.e.: ensure security and legitimate authority; promote and respect human rights and gender equality; respect the rule of law; and provide basic services. Countries are fragile not only when they are on the road to collapse, but also when they are becoming viable once more.⁵⁶

The Canadian strategy in Haiti, which is part of its strategy for the Americas, aims to reinforce the strategic partnerships in the hemisphere. Canada sees this as an occasion to develop projects in trilateral cooperation, which reinforce relations with key countries in the Americas (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Mexico, the Dominican Republic). More generally, Haiti can become a laboratory where a new multilateralism for the Americas can be developed which could in turn serve as a model to manage other high-stake situations like the transition in Cuba.⁵⁷

Canada advocates putting into effect principles that favour more efficient international aid. These principles are taken from the Millennium Declaration and its development goals, the Monterrey Consensus, as well as the Paris Declaration and the principles of engagement with fragile states of the OECD. The application of these principles and goals imply a thorough knowledge of the context, as well as an acceptance of the different rates of change that exist between the providers of aid and the recipients of that aid.

In the framework of their first coordination meeting on Haiti in December 2006, the deputy ministers of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (diplomacy), the Canadian International Development Agency (development), National Defence, Public Safety, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (defence), reached an agreement on a government-wide development

⁵⁶ Report of the Permanent Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, December 2006

⁵⁷ CIDA strategy document not yet published.

strategy. This approach, referred to as 3D (diplomacy, development and defence), is advocated for fragile states.

Canadian ministers of international cooperation, foreign affairs, the Prime Minister himself, as well as the Governor General have all visited Haiti over the last three years. Conferences that brought together ministerial representatives from Brazil and Canada and which focused on Haiti were organized in Brazil, illustrating the diplomatic aspect of the 3D approach.

Pangovernmental team

Canada is providing crucial support to Haiti through a variety of Canadian government departments and agencies – in particular, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Correctional Service Canada, and the Department of National Defense (DND).

Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT)

The Department contributes by coordinating pangovernmental efforts as well as mobilizing Canadian, international, and regional partners thanks to its high-level contacts in the political and senior government officials. Haiti is one of DFAIT's priority countries for its Global Peace and Security Fund, which is administered by the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START).

Canadian International Development Agency

The Agency is in charge of Canadian assistance to Haiti. (See below the list of projects.)

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

Through the International Peace Operations Program of the RCMP, members of the Canadian Civil Police force are sent abroad through UNPOL and work with the Haitian National Police on areas such as management, professional standards, training, and mentoring.

Correctional Service Canada (CSC)

The service works in collaboration with its partners in the international community to contribute to the reform of the legal system and supports the Haitian government's efforts to reinforce its correctional system.⁵⁸ [i]

In its strategy document CIDA underlines Canada's support for MINUSTAH in the long term and in the context of the evolution of traditional peace missions which tend now to be more complex and integrated. The mandate assigned to aid in the face of conflict (where there is neither war nor peace and a resurgence of the conflict is possible) has widened and become more complex. Aid today has to deal with issues that were not traditionally part of its remit – security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration – in a preventative

approach which tackles the tensions and dysfunctions that are likely to lead to another conflict.⁵⁹

Finally, as far as the development aspect is concerned, since the figures for recent engagements and those yet to come, which will be included in the context of national strategy (NSGPR, Haiti's National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction), are not yet known, below we have used for illustrative purposes a table which synthesizes the breakdown of aid by sector for the past few years.

CIDA expenditures in Haiti: 2002-2012⁶⁰

In little over a week at the end of August 2008, Haiti suffered the devastating effects of hurricanes Fay and Gustav in addition to tropical storm Hannah. Evaluations put the estimates at close to 800,000 in need of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction aid. The number of Haitians directly or indirectly affected by these extreme metrological conditions was much higher. Some estimate that the economic impact of these catastrophes might actually be greater than hurricane Jeanne that hit Haiti in 2004. A large percentage of the population was already trying to overcome massive challenges – 53% of Haitians live on less than USD \$1 a day while the cost of basic foodstuffs has increased more than 40% since the beginning of the year.

Floods in Haiti – Emergency response and enforcement agencies	Length	Amount
Pan American Health Organization The PAHO coordinates humanitarian work in the health sector, the spread of contagious diseases and vector control; continued access to health care and medication, ensuring that reproductive health measures are in place and that women can safely give birth.	2008/2010	\$232 000
World Vision The organisation meets needs through emergency shelter, health and hygiene for approximately 1,500 families of the Central Plateau, the Gonaves and the Northwest area of Haiti. The organization distributes bedding and hygienic articles, kitchen utensils, and containers for water.	2008/2009	\$250 000
World Food Programme The WFP provides coordination and information management services that support emergency operations and humanitarian organizations to help ensure a more effective response. It also coordinates logistical aspects such as air, sea, and ground transportation, storage,	2008/2009	\$750 000

⁵⁹ Jean-Bernard Veron, L'aide au développement, Évolutions récentes et grands débats, French Development Agency, 2005.

⁶⁰ These figures are based on the calculations of Stephen Baranyi, in Le Canada, Haiti et les dilemmes de l'intervention dans les 'Etats fragiles', a study presented to the LASA Congress, Montreal, September 2007. These amounts are inferior to those presented by CDA, which claims it invests more than \$100,000,000 CAD per year in Haiti since 2004. See Stephen Baranyi's study for more details.

information management, GIS cartography (Geographic Information Systems) and protecting convoys.

International Organisation for Migration 2008/2009 \$1 000 000

The IOM provides transportation and distributes non-food essentials; provides tools and materials required for reconstructing housing; supports the protection of disaster victims; improves temporary housing.

2008/2008 \$500 000

United Nations Children's Fund

UNICEF provides affected families with access to clean drinking water and sewage facilities and provides training/awareness activities on reducing the risks of waterborne disease.

CECI

2008/2009 \$293 000

The Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI) distributes toiletries and kitchen utensils to 1,760 families, helps them participate in cleaning and reconstruction of homes and schools, and creates remunerated work programs. 700 people from the following areas have been targeted: Gonaïves, Saint Marc, Ennery and Gros Morne, in the area of Artibonite.

Oxfam Québec

2008/2009 \$250 000

Oxfam provides 1,500 families with access to emergency housing and necessary household items by distributing bedding, mosquito nets, kitchen utensils and construction and renovation materials. To ensure that 1,500 families in the areas of Artibonite and Nippes have access to clean drinking water for adequate hygiene, the organisation distributes bottled water, water purification tablets and personal items.

Children's Aid

2008/2009 \$234 000

AEC tries to protect 7,000 families in the areas of Cabaret, Fonds-Verrettes and Ganthier against public health risks and distributes clean drinking water, toiletries and bedding, in addition to kitchen utensils.

Other projects and enforcement agencies

Support Project to the Primature (Appui à la Primature en Haïti) 2007/2009 \$565 000

The Haitian Prime Minister is supported by Canadian expertise in order to support the creation and implementation of external political cooperation and the coordination and fostering political dialogue with international partners.

Debt and national development service	2007/2010	\$16 000 000
<p>Department of Economy and Finance of the Government of Haiti</p> <p>CIDA distributes a large part of its assistance to Haiti through grants. In 2003, the Agency financed the Centre for the Management of Local Grants, which administers and coordinates the money given through a variety of grants.</p>		
Centre for the Management of Local Grants – Phase II	2005/2010	\$11 636 000
Batilavi CGF Fund	2007/2011	\$6 000 000
<p>Emergency funds for the inner-city population of Port-au-Prince and the Gonaïves.</p>		
Development and Employment Funds - phase II CGF	2006/2011	\$5 000 000
<p>Finances small production investments, welfare amenities or water installations in the inner-city areas of Port-au-Prince as well as in other regions covered by the Canadian program.</p>		
Democracy and Peace Support Fund (FDP) CGF	2006/2011	\$5 000 000
<p>Supports good governance and human rights and promotes democracy and peace in Haiti. Projects are financed and implemented by Haitian civil society organizations as well as by state institutions.</p>		
Health and Education Fund - phase II CGF	2005/2012	\$19 000 000
<p>Improve the quality, access and governance of basic education services and basic healthcare for underprivileged populations in areas targeted by Canadian development.</p>		
Economic development and employment Fund (FODEM) CGF	2005/2011	\$7 000 000
<p>Promotes job creation by supporting economic and community opportunities that support the local population to manage its own development and support the rehabilitation and the construction of social and economic infrastructure.</p>		
Social Development Fund CGF	2002/2010	\$12 000 000
<p>Contributes to increased health and education services, increased access to these services and increased quality of services for the communities they serve.</p>		
	2001/2009	\$5 000 000
<p>Fund for Support of Justice and Human Rights - Phase II</p> <p>This project supports initiatives that promote access to justice and defend the rights of Haitians before the courts.</p>		
Support Unit (UAPC) - Phase V	2005/2008	\$5 000 000

It is a structure supporting Canada's cooperation program in Haiti whose goal is to increase the effectiveness of Canada's official development aid in Haiti.

Health System Development Support Embassy of Canada	2006/2011	\$18 750 000
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The PADESS project aims to harmonize governance activities in the health sector. It also aims to bring about change through three components that focus on: i) strengthening the regulatory role of the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP); ii) developing a shared vision of the health sector; and iii) strengthening Canada's aid effectiveness.

CIDA also assists projects through multilateral executing agencies

Extended Vaccination Program Support OPS	2007/2012	\$17 500 000
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The project aims to reduce infant mortality through expansion of routine immunization to include all departments of the country.

Basic Economic Infrastructure Renovation Inter-American Development Bank	2007/2009	\$19 800 000
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This project allows for 8 to 15 additional projects, primarily in area of roads.

Les Cayes-Jérémie Road Route. Inter-american Development Bank	2008 /2011	\$75 000 000
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The project consists of constructing and rehabilitating 92 km of road between Les Cayes and Jérémie, including paving, drainage, and signage.
Local development - Communes of Marmelade and Plaisance

	2005/2010	\$5 000 000
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Food and Agriculture Organization

This project helps farmers control their individual and collective development and increase their income by diversifying and improving their agricultural output while ensuring soil conservation.

United Nations Appeal to Support Haiti's Stabilization UNDP – Haiti	2007/2009	\$9 225 000
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The objective of this project is to promote equality between men and women and social peace in Haiti.

Local Development - Nord-Est UNDP	2005/2010	\$3 650 000
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This project aims at continuing efforts to improve living conditions within the four communes of the department of Nord-Est.

Project State of Rights in Haiti	2006/2009	\$5 000 000
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UNDP

This project strengthens the Ministry of Justice and

the penitentiary system in the development of legal and judicial services. Support for the Ministry of Justice	2005/2010	\$5 000 000
Agence Intergouvernementale de la francophonie		
Institutional strengthening and improving the operation of the judicial apparatus. Support for the OAS Special Mission	2004/2009	\$10 000 000
Organization of American States Supports the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Mission and its contribution to conflict resolution.		
CIDA also directly supports Canadian NGOs and their projects in Haiti		
Support to the Haitian Government	2006/2011	\$5 000 000
The Parliamentary Centre builds the capacities of the Parliament and parliamentary commissions in the interest of more effective preparation and passage of legislature. Governance Strengthening,	2007/2012	\$4 999 600
École Nationale d'administration Publique		
Contributes to strengthening governance in Haiti through the transfer of expertise from the public service of Quebec and the École nationale d'administration publique (ÉNAP) to the public service of Haiti to meet the needs expressed by the Government of Haiti, particularly by strengthening public-sector financial management and the development of a professional public service and providing support in capacity-building and technology transfer. Health Management Capacity Building Support	2006/2011	\$17 500 000
Université de Montréal		
The health management capacity building support project (PARC) aims to improve governance of Haiti's health system by helping: i) to develop and implement human resources development policies and strategies in the health sector; ii) to strengthen health management training systems; and iii) to achieve knowledge and ongoing improvement of health management training systems. Support to combat STI/HIV/AIDS - Phase II	2006/2012	\$19 060 000
Consortium CCISD-CECI		
Reduction in the spread of sexually transmitted		

infections (STIs) and HIV/AIDS in Artibonite Department, thanks to support for: i) governance of health institutions; ii) appropriate services (welcoming attitudes, treatment, monitoring, availability of drugs), high-risk clientele (sex trade workers, youth, women victims of violence); and iii) general STI/HIV/AIDS services.

Preventive, Care and Treatment for HIV/AIDS in Cité-Soleil 2007/2009 \$500 000

Médecins du Monde Canada

Supports the Centre hospitalier Sainte-Catherine de Labouré (CHOSCAL) at Cité Soleil to create a centre for the case management of vulnerable persons affected with HIV.

Local Development Program 2006/2011 \$20 000 000
CECI/CRC SOGEMA INC./ENAP/SOCODEVI

Socio-economic development aimed at improving living conditions by directly addressing the problem of low income earners within the population as a whole, focusing on the promotion of small businesses, and encouraging environmental protection and agricultural productivity.

ACOOPECH - phase III 2005/2015 \$15 000 000

Développement international Desjardins

Support to Haitian Savings and Credit Cooperatives (ACOOPECH).

Support for local development and agroforestry in Nippes 2005/2010 \$6 150 000

Oxfam Québec

Promoting agroforestry models that will ensure better management of natural resources and assist with agricultural marketing.

Peace Consolidation 2007/2008 \$77 000

Institute for State Effectiveness

Haitian literature review for a two-day workshop in Ottawa with CIDA representatives and other involved Canadian government departments involved in Haiti's development as well as the Government of Haiti's ministries.

Economic relations

Canada signed an accord with Haiti in 2003 in the context of the Initiative for Less Developed Countries (ILDC) which aimed to eliminate customs tariffs on all Haitian products with the exception of milk, poultry and eggs. Interest in this initiative resurfaced during a conference sponsored by CIDA and Scotiabank and coordinated by the Canadian embassy in Haiti on 15 March 2007.

The ILDC also enables Canada to import from Haiti textiles and other related products free of duty. Representatives from the Haitian textile industry have subsequently visited Canada. This industrial sector could provide some interesting commercial opportunities.

Key Challenges Updated January 4, 2010

SECTION CONTENTS: [KEY DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES](#) | [CAPACITY BUILDING](#) | [STRE FRAGILE STATE](#) | [DONORS AND COOPERATION AGENCIES: AN ESSENTIAL PRESENCE](#) | [CO](#)

Key development challenges

The National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (NSGPR) has become the current government's frame of reference, the strategy for reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of reducing poverty in half before 2015

In order to reach these expected results in the 3 pillars of the National Strategy, it is imperative that a minimal consensus be reached with civil society. Efforts to overcome dissension within society must continue and lead to consensus-building structures from which concerted actions can emerge. The state must take its responsibilities and continue implementing necessary changes in key sectors of society, such as police and justice. The fight against corruption, insecurity and impunity is necessary in order to allow for a return of productive investments by foreigners and the private sector. The state must play its role as regulator by strengthening the private-public partnership in sectors like education.

Capacity Building

State institutions that will be at the forefront of NSGPR implementation are still quite weak. The Public Administration's diagnosis as described in the UNDAF 2009-2011 Plan, reveals its low productivity, its inefficiency characterized by poor and inadequate services, its vulnerability in terms of the political twists and turns, the non-conformity in the way the departments currently function with regard to all things legal and regulatory, the inadequate activities for the institution's missions, a great technical loss as the highest qualified professionals have left, a poor mastery of budgetary mechanisms and poor financial management, an excessive centralization that relieves the decentralized structures of their responsibilities, the government's weakness is also shown by a lack of human resources that are often not available or are improperly allocated – which breeds a chronically under-administrated state. Certain reports state that there is a miniscule number of human resources, namely, 0.5 agents for every 100 inhabitants. In urban areas, it is 1.2 compared to 0.1 at the community level. The administration's failure can be seen in the shortage of public services and, outside of the urban centres, by the absence of community facilities. There has

been a substantial rural exodus which means an explosive increase in the number of slums and a growing insecurity.

The shortage of qualified staff in public administration, the deficit in national capacities and institutional development remain crucial problems, as 83% of what was once the country's qualified workforce is no longer in Haiti.⁶¹ All senior executives of state institutions, the private sector and the general public should participate in discussions leading to the development of this strategy and especially to have a sense of ownership of it.

A condition sine qua non for successful implementation of the National Strategy is a policy of human resources management integrating a capacity building program for executing institutions, technical directorates, and sectoral programming units to enable them to absorb and manage activities.

Strengthening a Fragile State

Haiti is considered to be a fragile State. This concept describes a country where there is: failure of the rule of law, powerlessness of the state, illegitimacy of the state, economic dysfunction, and weak society. In addition to these internal factors there are also other supranational factors.

Nonetheless, to ensure effective implementation and tracking of operations and activities planned through the NRGPR, it is imperative that Haiti strengthen its national capacities in order to absorb and manage the various activities of this strategy, to reinforce the ministerial Sectoral Programming Units (SPUs), to ensure coherence between state institutions involved in the Strategy, to assist ownership of the program by senior executives in executing institutions, the general public (civil society, socio-professional groups, political parties) and to coordinate donors.

Donors and Cooperation Agencies: An Essential Presence

Donors and cooperation agencies support the Haitian government financially and technically in the humanitarian, recovery and development areas. The UN system is involved in all sector activities, be they urgent or long-term. Through its numerous specialized agencies, it influences every action and strategy of the government. With the support of the IADB, the EU as well as bilateral and multilateral agencies these agencies are actors in policy and policy-making.

The following table illustrates loan and donation commitments of the eight largest funding countries as reflected in Haiti's national budget 2009-2010 :


1	European Union	\$ 315 628 577	27%
2	USA	\$ 298 154 560	25%
3	Inter-American Development Bank	\$ 216 004 500	19%
4	Canada	\$ 104 787 122	9%
5	World Bank	\$ 56 912 510	5%

⁶¹ Edmond Mulet, [Roundtable discussion](#), Center for Strategic and International Studies, 27 January 2007.

6	France	\$ 42 278 193	3.65%
7	Spain	\$ 37 785 155	3.3%
8	Venezuela	\$ 29 658 537	2.6%

Source : Ministère de l'économie et des finances, projet de loi sur les finances, exercice 2009-2010, République d'Haïti.

Sometimes, the international community leads the government in going in the same direction as itself. Financing approximately 60% of Haiti's investment budget, it remains, and will remain for a long time, a strong player able to tip the scales and to make its voice heard.



Source : Ministère de l'économie et des finances, projet de loi sur les finances, exercice 2009-2010, République d'Haïti. (Ministry of Economy and Finance, Finance Bill 2009-2010, Republic Of Haiti)

Considering its presence in the country, the government must respect its commitments to the international community. Every large-scale program currently running in the country is financed by the international community: in other words, the international community underwrites 60% of the billions of dollars of current and future projects.

Coordination

The Haitian government, donors and partners all agreed to build on lessons learned from the past and to quickly establish activities for stabilizing the country. Social, economic and political recovery is supposed to be based on solid foundations. It is thus necessary to implement measures to deal with certain constraints related to the internal operations of funding agencies, such as: lack of confidence between donors and the government, ineffective

conditions, divergent donors' requirements of the government, lack of reflection on the roles and responsibilities of state institutions, and lack of communications with the Haitian people.

More concretely, attention should be focused on the way donors function, coordination between donors, disbursement procedures and technical support to Sectoral tables—a coordination and tracking mechanism used by the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation to ensure that projects being considered are consistent with national strategies—in order to establish structured, clear and consistent interventions.

Critical Analysis Updated March 30, 2009

SECTION CONTENTS: [MINUSTAH - Disappointing results](#) | [Acceptance and debate over the mandates](#) | [Sex scandals and internal corruption in MINUSTAH](#) | [The Latin American presence in MINUSTAH](#) | [Analysis of Canadian involvement](#)

MINUSTAH - Disappointing results

Despite some seemingly successful moments, the UN's intervention as a whole has to be seen as a failure (sometimes in conjunction with the OAS;⁶² a failure attributable as much to the predatory tendencies of the Haitian governments which succeeded each other during this period, as to insufficient follow-through on policies promoted by the international community.⁶³ Furthermore, the principle criticism levelled from all sides is that these missions left too soon without finishing what they started, that is, the real consolidation of the existing institutions (the national police and the judiciary).⁶⁴

The different missions expressed the necessity of rebuilding the state by strengthening the institutions which constitute it.⁶⁵ However the costs involved in creating such a process are simply too high for a country which, in the end, does not hold a strategic interest. In addition, numerous studies have underlined that the poor understanding of the Haitian context by MINUSTAH rendered it incapable of returning permanent security to the capital.

⁶² Barthelemy responds to Valdes, in *Le Monde* and *Le Matin*, 2005; James B. Foley, American ambassador in Haiti to 2004, quoted by Cary Hector in *La intervencion multinacional de 2004 en Haiti* Pensamiento Propio, enero-junio 2007, p. 16.

⁶³ Michele Pierre-Louis, doctoral speech Honoris Causa, Saint Michael College, Vermont, USA, 13 May 2004.

⁶⁴ Edmond Mulet, *Roundtable Discussion*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2007.

⁶⁵ Robert Fatton Jr., *Haiti: The Saturnalia of Emancipation and the Vicissitudes of Predatory Rule*, *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 27, no 1, 2006.

Acceptance and debate over the nature of the mandates

At no point was the presence of foreign military troops unanimously accepted in Haiti. From MIF to MINUSTAH, numerous voices were raised demanding the departure of the troops,⁶⁶ denouncing it as foreign occupation, which for certain people had interrupted the eventual confrontation necessary between a hated regime and its numerous opponents. During the transition government (2004-2006), on several occasions, accusations of the violation of the rights of Haitians were levelled against the military component of MINUSTAH.⁶⁷

Following Préval's election, the Security Council requested a re-evaluation of the mandate in order to determine whether it should be pursued as is, or not. For months different sectors in Haiti had been demanding changes to the mandate such that the military contingent, seen as of little use or even too tolerant to the destabilizing elements, be replaced by engineers and heavy machinery brought to Haiti to contribute to the reconstruction of the country's infrastructure.

However, even if undesirable, this military presence is seen by many Haitians as indispensable in the current circumstances and acts as a deterrent to all categories of bandits and armed gangs. Furthermore, MINUSTAH has helped the government and the national police substantially in their struggle against violence, drugs and the maintenance of order in the country at an acceptable level.

Sex scandals and internal corruption in MINUSTAH

Like many other UN missions, MINUSTAH has had its share of sex scandals. In 2005, following mounting criticism, the UN adopted a policy of zero tolerance, such that soldiers accused of misconduct are repatriated, tried and punished in their country of origin. At the end of November 2007, 108 Sri Lankan soldiers accused of sexual exploitation were repatriated.⁶⁸ The minister for women and women's rights insisted that the accused be tried immediately on their return to their country. Since the arrival of MINUSTAH in Haiti, women's rights organisations (SOFA, Kay Fanm)⁶⁹ have received several complaints of rapes committed by soldiers, police and civilian personnel.

The UN equally investigated fraud allegation and mismanagement in acquisitions in the context of its operations. Accusations were made against five employees for having influenced an oil delivery contract to the value of \$10 million US per year to a Haitian company, Distributeurs Nationaux SA.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Concertation National pour un Plaidoyer, Plate-forme pour un Développement Alternatif, two Haitian NGO group.

⁶⁷ Zibechi.

⁶⁸ www.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/International/2007/11/02/009-Haiti-ONU-sexe.

⁶⁹ See SOFA report 2007, [Violence faite aux femmes en Haiti \(Violence against women in Haiti\)](#)

⁷⁰ Haiti Press Network, 21 December 2007.

The Latin American presence in MINUSTAH

Seen by some as a regional effort in solidarity, the significant presence of troops, police and civilian personnel of Latin American origin demonstrates those countries' interest in the mission. 80% of the military and police force comes from the South American continent [Mullet, 2007].⁷¹

Despite sending additional police in 2008, **close to 95% of the Latin American resources were military**. Only 11% of the police force and 11% of the international civilian force came from the Latin American countries. The heads of these countries repeatedly complained that they should be better represented in the two above-mentioned areas of the Mission.⁷²

Brazil's presence in the mission is highly visible as the leader of the military component. The Brazilian supporters of this presence argued that Brazil had to assume its regional leadership responsibilities to be recognized as such in international forums (mainly within the UN), and it represented an opportunity to put into action its multilateral policies. Indeed, this participation, supported by the Brazilian congress, could have had positive internal consequences as well as the external ones. It would increase the dialogue already in existence with countries of the sub-region (albeit in different contexts, Mercosur, for example) such as Argentina and Chile, in cooperation with the other members of the Core Group (Canada amongst others) in the context of joint projects. However both the Left and the Right denounced this involvement as an exercise in regional neo-imperialism, or even the subordination of Brazilian interest to that of the United States.⁷³

The presence of Latin American countries in MINUSTAH has been questioned and the arguments brandished for national autonomy and freedom of action, responsibility towards the UN, do not hold for certain critics. Chile was the first country in the region, from March 2004, to send troops to the multinational force. Argentina and Brazil followed in June. These decisions were taken in a hasty manner, without real coherence and with the absence of regional coordination and planning. From this critical point of view, the presence of these countries is counter-current to the policy of regional peace and security. Individual national interests took precedence over the collective interests of the region and the Latin American decision regarding Haiti cannot be interpreted as an altruistic act whose primary aim is the democratic stability or the defence of the rights of the Haitian people.⁷⁴

Analysis of Canadian involvement

Canada's involvement can be defined as a cooperation which necessitates finding a balance between the results desired in the short term in order to maintain stability, and those for the long term which could bring more lasting development.

However, Muggah identifies weaknesses of Canadian cooperation in governance; in particular, he criticizes the simplistic understanding of the local context, which results in a lack of appropriate entry points as well as in difficulties of achieving coherence with partners.⁷⁵ For

⁷¹ Edmond Mulet, *ibid*.

⁷² David Morin, OIF Report, to be published in 2009

⁷³ Flavio Rocha de Oliveira, Gilberto M. A. Rodrigues, Thiago, 'A crise do Haiti: historia perspectives e a MINUSTAH', *CRIES*, 2007, p.3.

⁷⁴ Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, Salir de Haiti, in Haiti Info, 6 Jan 2005

⁷⁵ Muggah, p. 168.

example, Canada has been involved in the reform of the justice system from the mid-1990s, favouring infrastructure (building county courts, reinforcing clerks' offices) to the detriment of the heart of the problem - the interweaving of the judicial and executive branches. Its involvement in the security sector is following the same path, that is to say, by guaranteeing financial support for the reconstruction of the national police headquarters, border posts and the police academy. All this without entering into the constructive debate over what type of security, what kind of police force and what their relationship with the judicial system will be - questions that are essential to the establishment of rule of law in Haiti.

Canada is a player committed for the long term, but one that has had changing priorities as Muggah has explained. Canadian cooperation is learning lessons from its successes and failures. The emphasis it now seeks to place on good governance, although justified, seems contradictory to the way aid has been funnelled over the course of the last three years.⁷⁶ It will be useful to pursue the analysis of the allocation of this cooperation over the next few years.

Finally, it is important to underline here that many voices were raised in Canada, the United States, the Caribbean and in Latin America, on the morning of 1 March 2004, denouncing the participation of their countries in what they called a 'military coup' in Haiti.⁷⁷ More moderate opinion questioned Canadian military intervention and shared along with their Caribbean partners their disappointment at having, in their eyes, abandoned too soon the diplomatic efforts underway.⁷⁸

From the Field Updated March 30, 2009

SECTION CONTENTS:

⁷⁶ Baranyi, p. 19.

⁷⁷ Press for Conversion, CIDA's Key Role in Haiti's 2004, Coup d'Etat. www.coast.ncf.ca.

⁷⁸ Jim Hodgson, 'Dissonant Voices' in Haiti, Hope for a Fragile State, eds. Shamsie and Thompson, WLU, 2006, p.105.